Case Analysis: Nathu vs State Of Uttar Pradesh
Case Details
Case name: Nathu vs State Of Uttar Pradesh
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Venkatarama Ayyar, J.
Date of decision: 21 September 1955
Proceeding type: Special Leave Petition
Source court or forum: High Court of Allahabad; Sessions Court, Allahabad
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
On the evening of 17 May 1952 the City Magistrate of Manipuri, Sri Nand Lal Kureel, discovered that his son, Sumer Singh, a boy of about ten years, was missing. After an unsuccessful search, he reported the disappearance to the police. Later that night a police informant identified two youths, Bhola and Ram Singh, who claimed that they and a third person had lured the boy away during the day. The police, accompanied by Sri Kureel, were taken to an out‑lying garden at about three in the morning, where, on the direction of Bhola and Ram Singh, the dead body of Sumer Singh was found in a well. A post‑mortem examination established death by asphyxia, and the courts below concluded that the death resulted from strangulation rather than accidental drowning.
Bhola (Accused 1) and Ram Singh (Accused 2) were detained until 22 May 1952 and, on 24 May, each gave a confessional statement before Special First‑Class Magistrate P.W. 28. In those statements they recounted that the appellant, Nathu (Accused 3), had instructed them to bring the boy, promised a payment of Rs 5 each, and, after luring the boy to the garden, had tied a cord around the boy’s neck, strangled him while they held his hands and feet, and then thrown the body into the well. Both statements were later retracted but were accepted by the trial courts as true and voluntary.
The appellant was first arrested on the night of 20‑21 May 1952, apparently on the basis of the confessions of Bhola and Ram Singh, and was released immediately. He was re‑arrested on 8 June 1952 after Sri Kureel complained to the Superintendent of Police about the lack of investigation. From 8 June to 7 August the appellant remained in jail. On 7 August he was taken for interrogation by CID Inspector P.W. 33 and was kept in separate custody until 20 August at the Krishna Talkies. On 21 August he executed a confessional statement (Exhibit P‑15) before Magistrate P.W. 28, in which he implicated the fourth accused, Bagh Ali, as the principal offender.
Bagh Ali (Accused 4), a dismissed head constable, had been bound over under Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 30 April 1952 and was suspected by Sri Kureel of involvement. He was arrested on 4 August 1952. All four accused were committed to the Sessions Court for trial on the charge of murder.
The Sessions Judge convicted Bhola and Ram Singh of murder and sentenced them to life transportation because of their ages (14 and 16). The appellant was convicted of murder on the basis of his own confession, corroborated by the testimony of P.W. 13 and P.W. 15 and by the confessions of Bhola and Ram Singh, and was sentenced to death. The fourth accused was acquitted for lack of corroboration. The High Court of Allahabad affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence of the appellant. The appellant then filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court, challenging the admissibility and voluntariness of the confessions and the adequacy of corroborative evidence.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was called upon to determine:
1. Whether the appellant’s confession recorded in Exhibit P‑15 was made voluntarily. The appellant contended that the prolonged separate custody from 7 August to 20 August, the alleged provision of intoxicants and promises of approver status rendered the confession involuntary. The State maintained that the confession was voluntary and that the lower courts had correctly found it so.
2. Whether, assuming voluntariness, the appellant’s confession was sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of P.W. 13 and P.W. 15. The appellant argued that P.W. 13’s evidence was incomplete and that P.W. 15 admitted ignorance of the deceased and the co‑accused, rendering the corroboration inadequate. The State asserted that the two witnesses placed the appellant with the victim near the garden at the material time, thereby satisfying the statutory requirement of corroboration.
3. Whether the confessions of the co‑accused (Exhibits P‑5 and P‑6) could be admitted as substantive evidence against the appellant. The appellant relied on the principle articulated in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh that such statements were not “evidence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act and could be considered only if independent corroborative material existed. The State argued that the co‑accused confessions, read together with the appellant’s confession, provided assurance of the truth of the latter.
4. Whether the co‑accused confessions could lend assurance to the appellant’s confession in the absence of any other independent substantive evidence. The appellant highlighted the inconsistency between the co‑accused statements, which identified the appellant as the principal offender, and the appellant’s own confession, which implicated Bagh Ali as the moving spirit. The State contended that the confessions collectively reinforced each other and satisfied the corroboration requirement.
5. Whether any independent substantive evidence existed on which a conviction of the appellant could be based. The appellant maintained that, apart from the disputed confessions, no reliable evidence linked him to the murder. The State relied solely on the confessions and the witness testimonies as the basis for conviction.
6. Whether the conviction and death sentence should be set aside on the ground of lack of a voluntary confession and insufficient corroboration. The appellant sought reversal of the conviction and sentence; the State sought affirmation of the lower courts’ findings.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
The Court applied the following statutory provisions and legal principles:
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code defined the offence of murder for which the appellant had been convicted.
Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code was the basis for the proceeding against the fourth accused, Bagh Ali.
Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code related to the confirmation of the death sentence.
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defined the scope of admissible evidence and excluded confessions of co‑accused from being “evidence” unless they were supported by independent corroboration.
The Court reiterated the well‑settled principle that a confession must be proved to be voluntary; otherwise it is inadmissible and cannot form the basis of a conviction. The prosecution bears the positive burden of establishing voluntariness and must rebut any inference of involuntariness arising from unusual custodial circumstances.
In line with the precedent set in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court held that statements of co‑accused are not substantive evidence and may be considered only when there exists independent material that can sustain a conviction. Such statements may lend “assurance” to the prosecution’s case only if they are consistent with other reliable evidence; contradictory statements cannot be treated as corroborative.
The Court also applied the corroboration test, requiring that a confession be supported by independent evidence that confirms its material particulars.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Supreme Court examined the circumstances surrounding the appellant’s confession. It observed that the appellant had been kept in separate custody by CID Inspector P.W. 33 from 7 August to 20 August without any satisfactory explanation. The Court held that such prolonged detention created a strong presumption of involuntariness, which the prosecution had failed to rebut. Consequently, the confession recorded on 21 August was deemed inadmissible.
Having found the confession inadmissible, the Court turned to the issue of corroboration. It noted that the only other evidence against the appellant consisted of the testimony of P.W. 13 and P.W. 15 and the confessions of the two younger accused. The Court found that the witness testimonies, even if believed, offered only limited corroboration of the appellant’s presence near the scene and became moot because the primary confession was excluded.
The Court reiterated that the confessions of Bhola and Ram Singh were not “evidence” within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. In the absence of any independent substantive material, these statements could not be used to sustain a conviction or to lend assurance to the appellant’s confession. The Court further emphasized that the inconsistencies between the co‑accused statements and the appellant’s own confession undermined any claim that they collectively corroborated each other.
In light of the lack of a voluntary confession and the absence of independent corroborative evidence, the Court concluded that the conviction could not be sustained. The legal tests of voluntariness, burden of proof, and corroboration were applied rigorously, leading to the determination that the prosecution’s case was fundamentally defective.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and the death sentence of the appellant, and ordered his release from custody. The judgment affirmed the principle that a confession must be voluntary to be admissible and that statements of co‑accused cannot, by themselves, corroborate a confession in the absence of independent evidence. Consequently, the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 and the capital sentence were vacated, and he was liberated.