Case Analysis: Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan And Anr

Case Details

Case name: Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan And Anr
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo, S.M. Sikri
Date of decision: 31 March 1966
Citation / citations: 1966 AIR 1773, 1966 SCR 123
Case number / petition number: Appeal No. 209 of 1964, Criminal Revision Application No. 913 of 1963
Neutral citation: 1966 SCR 123
Proceeding type: Appeal (special leave)
Source court or forum: Bombay High Court

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

Mrs. Veeda Menezes owned a house in Bombay where her husband rented the first floor to Yusuf Khan. On 17 January 1963 a servant of the appellant, Robert, called the respondent’s wife a thief and a “Halkat.” The following day the respondent slapped Robert’s face. A heated exchange of abusive words then occurred between the respondent and the appellant’s husband. In a fit of annoyance the respondent threw a file of papers at the husband; the file missed the husband and struck the appellant’s elbow, leaving a superficial scratch. The appellant lodged an information at Bandra police station alleging house‑trespass, the throwing of a shoe, the slapping of Robert, and a bleeding incised wound on her forearm. The investigating Sub‑Inspector recorded only a “mere scratch” on the appellant’s elbow. Both the appellant and Robert declined examination at a public hospital and were examined by a private medical practitioner who certified a small bleeding incised wound on the appellant’s forearm and a minor swelling on Robert’s arm, without bruises.

The matter was committed to the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Mazagaon, where a special prosecutor represented the State. The magistrate found the allegation of trespass to be false, disbelieved the claim that a shoe had been thrown, and held that only simple injuries had been caused. Accordingly, the magistrate convicted the respondent under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and imposed a fine of ten rupees on each count.

The appellant filed a revision before the Bombay High Court. The High Court, after observing that the appellant’s version was exaggerated, that the medical evidence lacked credibility, and that the injuries were trivial, set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent. The appellant then obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India (Appeal No. 209 of 1964). The Supreme Court heard the appeal on a final appellate stage under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was called upon to determine whether the general exception contained in Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code applied to the facts, i.e., whether an act that intentionally caused bodily hurt could be exempted where the injury was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain. The controversy centred on the interpretation of “harm” in Section 95 and on the assessment of the seriousness of the injuries.

Contentions of the appellant (Mrs. Veeda Menezes) were that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to invoke Section 95 because the respondent had intentionally inflicted bodily injury; that Section 95 was limited to non‑physical loss such as financial or reputational harm; and that the injuries, as described in the private medical report, were not trivial.

Contentions of the respondent (Yusuf Khan) and the State were that the injuries were merely superficial scratches and swelling, that the appellant had exaggerated the facts, and that the injuries were so slight that they fell within the ambit of Section 95, which therefore barred criminal liability under Section 323.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The Court considered Section 95 of the Indian Penal Code, which provides that “nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.” The provision was read in conjunction with Section 323 IPC, which criminalises voluntarily causing hurt. The Court examined the usage of the term “harm” in other sections of the Code (e.g., §§ 81, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 104, 106, 93, 415, 469, 499) and held that it embraces physical injury. The legal test applied was whether the injury was “so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain,” taking into account the nature of the injury, the relationship of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court first affirmed that Section 95 applied even when the act was performed with intent to cause injury, provided that the resulting harm was trivial. It rejected the appellant’s argument that the provision could not be invoked where physical injury was actually caused, emphasizing the plain language of the statute and the wide connotation of “harm” within the Code.

Applying the statutory test, the Court evaluated the factual record: the appellant sustained only a superficial scratch on her forearm, and the servant had a minor swelling without bruises. The private medical certificate, though describing a “bleeding incised wound,” did not establish a serious injury, and the High Court had already found the medical evidence unconvincing. The Court concluded that such injuries were indeed “so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain.” Consequently, the exception under Section 95 was deemed to operate, rendering the alleged offence under Section 323 non‑existent. The Court therefore upheld the High Court’s acquittal and found no ground to interfere with its judgment.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby confirming the acquittal of Yusuf Khan. It modified the earlier cost order by directing that Rs 750 be paid to the respondent and the remaining Rs 750 be returned to the appellant. The Court held that the injuries were trivial under Section 95, that the statutory exception barred criminal liability, and that the High Court’s decision was proper. The appeal was consequently dismissed, and the adjusted costs were ordered accordingly.