Case Analysis: BADKU JOTI SAVANT Vs. STATE OF MYSORE

Case Details

Case name: BADKU JOTI SAVANT Vs. STATE OF MYSORE
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri
Date of decision: 01/03/1966
Citation / citations: 1966 AIR 1746, 1966 SCR (3) 698
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1964
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Mysore High Court

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Badku Joti Savant, lived in a village adjoining Portuguese Goa. On 27 November 1960 the Deputy Superintendent of Customs, Goa Frontier Division, Belgaum, received information that contraband goods were concealed in the appellant’s house. Acting on that information, he entered the house with three panchas and conducted a search. The appellant was absent; his mother and sister‑in‑law were present. The search uncovered a steel trunk and a cane‑box in the loft of the kitchen. Inside the trunk a belt with four pouches was found; each pouch contained a gold bar bearing foreign marks and Goa Customs labels. The total weight of the gold bars was 343 tolas. A substantial sum of money, three small pieces of gold and additional currency notes were also seized.

On 30 November 1960 the appellant was arrested and interrogated by the same Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise. During the interrogation the appellant gave a written statement, which he signed after it was read back to him. In the statement he admitted that the four gold bars had been handed to him on the morning of 27 November 1960 by a person named Vittal Morajkar for delivery to a motor‑stand near Belgaum, and that the gold was foreign and its import was prohibited under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947.

The appellant was charged under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, read with section 9 of the Land Customs Act. The trial magistrate convicted him, imposed imprisonment, levied a fine and ordered confiscation of the gold bars. The appellant appealed to the Sessions Judge, who set aside the conviction and acquitted him, relying on the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Sitaram Agarwala v. State. The State appealed to the Mysore High Court. The High Court reversed the acquittal, held the appellant guilty on the basis of his statement and the seized evidence, and restored the magistrate’s order. A certificate of appeal was granted, and the matter reached the Supreme Court of India as Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1964.

The parties were: the appellant Badku Joti Savant; the State of Mysore represented by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs; the Deputy Superintendent of Customs, who acted as the investigating officer; and an intervener (Additional Solicitor‑General) who supported the State’s position.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was asked to decide two questions of law of general importance:

First question – the correct interpretation of section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and whether a person who was not directly concerned with the import of prohibited goods could be held liable under that provision.

Second question – the admissibility of the appellant’s written statement under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, specifically whether a Central Excise Officer qualified as a “police officer” within the meaning of that provision.

The appellant contended that the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise, being a Central Excise Officer, fell within the definition of “police officer” and that his confession should therefore be excluded. He further argued that the statement had been obtained by threats, invoking section 24 of the Evidence Act, and that the conviction under section 167(81) should be set aside.

The State contended that a Central Excise Officer was not a police officer for the purposes of section 25, that the statement was voluntarily given and not obtained by threats, and that the conviction under section 167(81) was proper in view of the earlier Supreme Court decision in Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal. The controversy therefore centred on the legal classification of a Central Excise Officer and the consequent admissibility of the confession.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The relevant statutory provisions were:

Sea Customs Act, 1878 – section 167(81) (offence of possession of prohibited foreign goods);

Land Customs Act, 1924 – section 9 (read with the Sea Customs Act);

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 – section 8(1) (prohibition on import of gold without RBI permission);

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – sections 24 and 25 (exclusion of confessions obtained by threat, inducement or promise, and exclusion of confessions made to a police officer);

Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 – sections 9, 13, 18, 19 and 21 (powers of arrest, search and enquiry conferred on Central Excise Officers);

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – sections 156, 173 and 190 (investigative powers of police and procedure for filing charge‑sheets).

The Court applied the test for determining whether a person was a “police officer” under section 25 by examining the statutory language, the purpose of the enactment and the scope of powers conferred. The test required a determination of whether the officer was “deemed to be the officer‑in‑charge of a police station” and whether he possessed the power to file a charge‑sheet under section 173 of the CrPC. The Court also applied the rule that a confession was excluded under section 24 only when it was proved to have been obtained by threat, inducement or promise.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court first observed that the interpretation of section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act had already been settled by its own earlier decision in Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal, which held that the provision could extend to persons who were not directly concerned with the import of prohibited goods. Accordingly, the Court accepted that the appellant fell within the ambit of that provision.

Turning to the second question, the Court examined the statutory scheme of the Central Excises and Salt Act. Although section 21(2) authorised a Central Excise Officer, when forwarding an arrested person for enquiry, to exercise powers “similar to those of an officer‑in‑charge of a police station”, the Court held that this limited delegation did not transform the officer into a police officer. The Court distinguished the present provision from section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, which expressly deemed an excise officer to be the officer‑in‑charge of a police station. Because the Central Excise Act contained no deeming clause and did not empower the officer to file a charge‑sheet under section 173 of the CrPC, the officer was not a “police officer” within the meaning of section 25.

Relying on the earlier decision in State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram, the Court affirmed that customs or excise officers, even when vested with investigative powers, were not police officers for evidentiary purposes. Consequently, the appellant’s written statement was not excluded by section 25.

The Court then considered section 24. The High Court had found no evidence that the statement was obtained by threats; the Supreme Court accepted that finding. Hence, the confession was not barred by section 24.

Having held the confession admissible and having found that the seized gold and money corroborated the appellant’s admission, the Court concluded that the conviction was legally sustainable.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, together with the fine and confiscation of the gold bars, were upheld. The relief sought by the appellant – reversal of the conviction, quashing of the sentence and restoration of the acquittal – was refused. The Court’s decision affirmed that a Central Excise Officer was not a “police officer” for the purposes of section 25 of the Evidence Act, and that the appellant’s confession was therefore admissible. The judgment consequently affirmed the conviction and dismissed the appeal.