Sarla Gupta and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement — 2025 INSC 645

Facts

The judgment in Sarla Gupta concerned two appeals arising from requests for documents in prosecutions under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, through proceedings which required the Court to distinguish the accused's entitlement to copies of material already before the Special Court from the entitlement to copies of records seized from the accused's premises and the separate power to seek production of other material at the appropriate stage. In the first appeal, arising from the Delhi High Court's judgment of 22 July 2019, the Central Bureau of Investigation had registered a first information report in July 2017 concerning alleged conspiracy, cheating and an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, upon which the Directorate of Enforcement registered its enforcement case information report before presenting a complaint alleging money laundering.

The complaint was filed on 24 August 2018 and the Special Judge took cognizance on 17 September 2018, through a prosecution in which the appellants were supplied the complaint and some documents but subsequently alleged that part of the material upon which the prosecution relied had not been supplied in a usable form. The appellants' requests included documents referred to in the complaint but not provided, copies which were illegible and material collected during investigation which they alleged had been withheld, through categories whose differing legal bases became important to the Supreme Court's analysis.

The material supplied had been arranged in eight volumes containing thousands of pages, although the first application identified approximately forty five documents said to be missing and eight documents said to be illegible, through a specific challenge which could not be reduced to a general request to obtain every item in the investigative file. A further application following inspection of the court's file identified illegible copies, absent material and duplicated numbering, through discrepancies between the court record and the copies supplied which the appellants relied upon to show that receiving a large collection did not establish that they had received complete and legible copies.

The Special Court rejected the requests on 30 March 2019 through an approach which treated the prosecution's obligation as confined to documents referred to and relied upon, while considering that documents collected but not relied upon need not be supplied and that the requests did not establish the basis which the court considered necessary for further production. The Delhi High Court dismissed the challenge to that order, through reasoning which regarded the ordinary provisions concerning supply of documents as inapplicable to the complaint proceedings and which also relied upon the fact that charges had not yet been framed.

The second appeal concerned the Punjab and Haryana High Court's judgment of 18 November 2022, arising from a prosecution linked to a predicate allegation of cheating in which the Directorate had conducted searches during August 2019 at the appellants' office and residential premises and seized documents, records and property. Applications concerning the list and copies of seized material had been made in the adjudicatory proceedings under the money laundering legislation, where the Adjudicating Authority allowed them and an appeal remained pending, although the accused also sought the documents before the Special Court to enable their defence in the criminal complaint.

The Special Court had taken cognizance on 31 August 2021 but rejected the document application on 22 March 2022, through reasoning which relied upon the continuing investigation and the limits upon an accused's use of documents outside the complaint at the stage of framing a charge. The High Court accepted that the appellants could seek the list of material which the Directorate did not rely upon, although it declined to grant copies of the seized documents on the basis that charge consideration concerned the prosecution material already filed. The Supreme Court therefore had before it refusals based upon treating the stage of charge as controlling every entitlement to documents, through decisions which required examination of whether a restriction upon using defence material for that purpose also eliminated distinct statutory rights to obtain copies.

Issues

The first issue was whether a person from whom records or documents had been seized under the money laundering legislation could obtain true copies notwithstanding the Directorate's decision not to rely upon them in its complaint, through a question concerning the express right attached to seizure rather than the separate rules governing the charge record. The Court also had to determine whether documents of title seized as property could be withheld from that person merely because the legislation classified them as property rather than records, although retention did not transfer ownership of the material to the Directorate.

The complaint proceedings raised the issue of what had to accompany process issued after cognizance, including documents annexed or produced with the complaint, material produced before cognizance, statements recorded by the Special Judge and corresponding material accompanying supplementary complaints. Because Sections 207 and 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were framed for procedural settings which did not literally describe a direct complaint before the money laundering Special Court, the Court had to determine whether their principles nevertheless informed the entitlement to documents through the right to a fair trial and the provisions applying ordinary criminal procedure where consistent.

The case further required distinction between the right to a list of material not relied upon, the ordinary restriction upon obtaining such material for a defence at charge consideration and the stronger entitlement to compel production when the accused entered upon defence evidence. The particular burdens imposed by Sections 24 and 45 raised related issues concerning whether document production powers should remain available to enable the accused to rebut the trial presumption and address the conditions governing a bail application, while protecting a continuing investigation from demonstrated prejudice. The Court also considered how documents obtained at the defence stage could be used for effective further cross examination and what consequences could be argued where relevant material was withheld, through questions which concerned meaningful defence rather than a formal right to request papers without an opportunity to use them.

Submissions

The appellants argued that the entitlement under Section 207 extended beyond documents selected by the prosecution and that Sections 207 and 208 required compliance before trial, through a position which relied upon the constitutional guarantee of a fair opportunity to defend against the criminal accusation. They contended that the money laundering legislation applied the ordinary Code through Sections 46 and 65 wherever no inconsistency existed, while referring to the corresponding provision in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita as part of their argument concerning continuity of the document safeguard.

The second appeal was supported through reliance upon the documents seized from the appellants' premises, together with the contention that the Directorate's custody of material could not deprive the accused of papers needed to defend the prosecution. The appellants also invoked the burdens associated with bail under Section 45, through an argument that an accused required access to potentially favourable documents to establish the reasonable grounds which the stringent provision required the court to consider.

The absence of committal in a money laundering complaint was said not to eliminate the application of ordinary procedural protections, because the Special Court's direct cognizance still led to a criminal trial in which the accused needed an effective opportunity to meet the case. The Directorate maintained that all material upon which it relied had already been supplied and that the accused had no entitlement to copies of other material at the stage of framing charge, through reliance upon the principle that defence documents outside the prosecution record were not ordinarily considered at that stage.

It further contended that an ongoing investigation prevented the accused from obtaining copies of unused documents before the inquiry was complete, while relying upon the guidelines concerning disclosure of a list as establishing a right to that list rather than immediate copies of every listed item. The Directorate argued that Section 208 concerned a Magistrate's proceedings before committal and did not apply to the Special Court's direct complaint jurisdiction, through a position which also asserted that the Special Court lacked the inherent powers of the High Court to order disclosure in the absence of a specific provision. The prosecution additionally relied upon the interlocutory character of the orders and the restraint ordinarily expected in interference with such decisions, although the Supreme Court had to determine whether the refusals had overlooked rights and powers available under the applicable statutes.

Reasoning

Seizure and retention did not extinguish the right to copies

The Court began the second appeal by examining the provisions authorising searches of premises and persons, through a distinction between Section 17's powers concerning buildings, places and other locations and Section 18's powers concerning a person and material in that person's possession or control. Those provisions authorised seizure of records and property in the circumstances prescribed, while supplying procedural requirements concerning recorded reasons, forwarding material to the Adjudicating Authority and applications for retention, through a structure which did not treat seizure as an unrestricted transfer of all interests in the material.

The definitions of records and property mattered because records included books and material stored in a computer, while property included deeds and instruments evidencing title or an interest in assets, through categories capable of including documents which the accused might require independently of the criminal complaint. The Court examined the retention provisions alongside the seizure powers, recognising that retention served the purposes specified by the legislation but did not amount to forfeiture or vest the seized property in the Directorate.

The fact that officials lawfully held an original therefore did not establish that the person from whom it had been taken could be denied every means of accessing its contents, because lawful retention and an entitlement to a true copy addressed different interests. Section 21 expressly entitled the person from whom records were seized or frozen to obtain copies, through a right which the Court treated as arising from the seizure itself rather than from the prosecution's later decision to select the record as evidence.

The accused's request for copies of such records accordingly could not be rejected merely because they were not relied upon in the complaint, since that reasoning overlooked the express entitlement which applied regardless of that selection. The Court's examination distinguished this right from a claim to receive copies of all material held by the Directorate from every source, because the statutory basis concerned the records seized from the person seeking access rather than an unlimited claim to the investigative file.

Documents of title remained accessible despite their classification as property

The Court addressed the position of deeds and instruments of title because the definition of property included them, through a category which might otherwise be used to argue that the express provision concerning copies of records did not extend to every document seized. The Court found no prohibition upon supplying copies of those instruments to the person from whom they had been seized, because their retention did not transfer ownership to the Directorate and did not justify depriving the person of access to information concerning title or interests in property.

A construction under which the original could be retained and even a copy denied would make the provision arbitrary, through an outcome which the Court considered inconsistent with Article 14 rather than a necessary consequence of the property's seizure. The Court therefore held that true copies of seized documents and records had to be provided to the person from whom or from whose premises they had been taken, through a conclusion which included instruments forming part of seized property without treating seizure as permission to suppress their contents.

This reasoning did not require the physical return of every original immediately, since retention remained governed by the statutory provisions, but it preserved access to a copy while the original remained lawfully held for the purposes which justified retention. The distinction was important because a demand for return could raise questions about continuing statutory custody which a demand for a true copy did not necessarily raise, through different forms of relief which the lower courts had not adequately separated.

Where the documents were extensive, the Court recognised that electronic copies could be supplied, through a practical means of satisfying the right without treating the volume of material as a reason to deny it. The right required true and usable copies rather than an empty assurance of access, because a copy whose contents could not be read would not enable the person to understand or use the record whose original had been taken.

The Court's conclusion nevertheless distinguished documents from other seized property, since for other items the person was entitled to the seizure memorandum and list rather than a supposed obligation to supply duplicate physical objects. The rules governing the seizure memorandum required an inventory in the prescribed form and delivery of the list to the occupant or an appropriate representative, through a separate protection ensuring that the person could know what property had been taken.

The case before the Court concerned supply of seized documents and records, through a scope which prevented its conclusion from being treated as a determination of every dispute about return, freezing or confiscation of property. The Court therefore held that the Special Court and High Court had erred by rejecting the request on the basis of the charge stage, because that reasoning failed to give effect to a right arising from seizure which did not depend upon whether the document could presently be used to resist charge.

Receiving a document did not make it part of the charge record

The Court expressly preserved the distinction between receiving copies of seized documents and relying upon them at the stage of framing charge, because the statutory entitlement to access did not alter the principles determining what material the court considered at that stage. A document could therefore have to be supplied even though it was not relied upon in the complaint and the accused was not entitled to introduce it as defence material during charge consideration, through a position which reconciled the seizure right with the separate procedural rule.

The lower courts had treated the restriction upon charge use as a reason to withhold copies, although that approach merged two questions whose legal bases differed and thereby deprived the appellants of an entitlement independent of their proposed use. The Court's reasoning required each question to be answered under the relevant provision, through an approach which preserved the prosecution's charge record without allowing that record to define every right of access to the accused's own seized papers.

This distinction also explained why the pending investigation did not supply a general answer to the request for copies of documents taken from the appellants, because the asserted need to continue holding originals did not eliminate the separate right which the statute recognised. The decision thus granted document relief without deciding that the contents exonerated the appellants or that charges must be refused, since the truth and legal significance of the material remained for the appropriate stages of the criminal proceedings.

The Special Court's complaint jurisdiction remained subject to procedural fairness

The Court considered the first appeal by examining the structure under which a Special Court designated under the money laundering legislation tried the offence, through a jurisdiction exercised by a Court of Session rather than by an institution wholly detached from ordinary criminal procedure. The legislation permitted the Special Court to take cognizance upon a complaint without the accused first being committed for trial, although that direct route did not eliminate the need to conduct the ensuing proceedings in accordance with the applicable provisions governing a sessions trial.

The Court therefore recognised that the framing of a charge remained part of the complaint process, through a stage which could not be treated as evidence that the accused had no right to documents until the entire trial had commenced. The provisions applying the Code to proceedings before the Special Court, subject to what the money laundering enactment otherwise provided, required examination of actual inconsistency rather than a general assumption that the special character of the offence excluded ordinary safeguards.

The authority in Yash Tuteja supported the application of the complaint provisions concerning judicial examination of whether a prima facie case existed and the issue of process, through a framework which required the Special Court to apply its mind before taking the steps which brought the accused before it. The Court's reference to those provisions did not determine that the complaint in these appeals should have been dismissed on its merits, because the issue concerned the documents which had to be supplied once cognizance and process were based upon the complaint.

The significance of the complaint procedure was that the accused's opportunity to meet the accusation had to correspond with the material upon which the Special Court had acted, rather than being limited to a selection which the investigating agency later chose to characterise as relied upon. The absence of committal therefore changed the route by which the Special Court became seized of the case but did not remove the underlying requirement that the accused receive the complaint and its constituent material.

Process had to carry the complaint and its constituent documents

Section 204 required process issued in proceedings instituted upon a written complaint to be accompanied by a copy of that complaint, through an obligation which the Court applied to a complaint under the money laundering legislation. Where documents were annexed or produced with the complaint and supplied the basis upon which cognizance was taken, the Court considered them part of the complaint for this purpose rather than material which could be separated from the accusation when copies were supplied.

The entitlement therefore extended to those documents as a matter of right, because receiving only the narrative without the supporting material would deprive the accused of part of the case which had moved the Special Court to proceed. The same principle applied to supplementary complaints and the documents accompanying them, through a continuing obligation which prevented later additions to the prosecution case from escaping the safeguard merely because the original complaint had already been supplied.

Where the Special Judge recorded statements of the complainant or witnesses before taking cognizance, copies of those statements also had to be furnished, because the judicial decision could depend upon them as well as upon the written complaint and annexures. The Court further included the documents produced by the Directorate up to the taking of cognizance, including statements under Section 50 where they had been produced before the Special Court, through a category defined by the material before the court rather than only the agency's description of its reliance.

After cognizance, the Directorate could not argue that a document placed with the complaint or in those proceedings was excluded because it was not a relied upon document, since the right arose from its production within the material upon which the process proceeded. This conclusion required attention to the actual court record, through an examination which the appellants' inspection had attempted when identifying absent and illegible documents rather than merely disputing the number of volumes supplied.

The Court's reasoning thus supported meaningful completeness, because the formality of providing many documents did not establish compliance if specific components of the complaint record remained unavailable or unreadable. The right was not conditioned upon the accused first showing that a missing document would necessarily cause discharge, since the entitlement to know and meet the material forming the accusation preceded an assessment of how effectively that material could be challenged.

The principles of Sections 207 and 208 informed the right to defend

The Court acknowledged that Sections 207 and 208 did not on their face precisely describe a direct complaint under the money laundering legislation, because one addressed proceedings instituted upon a police report and the other concerned a complaint before a Magistrate in a case exclusively triable by a Court of Session. That textual distinction did not justify rejecting their underlying principles of fair play in the Special Court's complaint process, since their object was to protect the accused's ability to understand and defend the prosecution through access to the material upon which it proceeded.

The Court therefore applied those principles alongside the complaint-copy requirement and Article 21, through reasoning which preserved fairness without pretending that the direct complaint had become a police report or that a committal stage had occurred when the legislation dispensed with it. Section 207 identified the police report, first information report, specified witness statements, confessions and other documents forwarded with the report as material to be supplied, through a structure which recognised that the accused required the evidentiary basis as well as the bare statement of the charge.

Section 208 similarly recognised statements recorded in the complaint proceedings and documents upon which the prosecution proposed to rely, through a safeguard adapted to another procedural route but serving the same essential purpose of an effective defence. The Court drew from this structure the requirement that the Special Judge direct supply of the complaint, pre cognizance statements and the documents produced in connection with the complaint, rather than accept an assertion that the special route deprived the accused of comparable access.

The interpretation was grounded in the consistency of these protections with the money laundering scheme, because no conflicting provision required the accused to meet the complaint while denied the material which formed part of it. The result preserved the distinctions between statutory routes while refusing to allow those distinctions to defeat the substantive protection which the right to a fair trial required.

Exclusion of part of a statement required judicial consideration

The Court examined the procedure under which a police officer could request exclusion of part of a witness statement from the copies supplied, through a limited power which required the officer to identify the part and explain the reasons for withholding it. The grounds concerned irrelevance to the proceeding or circumstances in which disclosure was not essential in the interests of justice and was inexpedient in the public interest, through conditions which prevented exclusion from becoming an unexplained choice left entirely with the agency.

The Magistrate was required to consider the request and reasons but was not bound to accept them, because the statutory proviso preserved authority to direct that the whole statement or an appropriate portion be furnished despite the officer's proposed exclusion. This structure demonstrated that even an express withholding mechanism remained subject to judicial assessment, through a safeguard which the Court contrasted with a broad assertion that the prosecution could decide what the accused should receive solely by choosing what to call relied upon.

The Court also stressed that this power concerned parts of statements and did not extend to the category of documents forwarded with the report, through a distinction which prevented the limited exception from being enlarged into a general permission to withhold documentary material. The treatment of extensive documents likewise concerned the form of access rather than an unqualified denial, since the ordinary Code contemplated inspection where the volume made copies impractical.

These distinctions supported the Court's insistence upon a usable opportunity to understand the case, because the provisions recognised practical accommodations and specified exceptions without eliminating the underlying duty to make the material available. The references to the provisions governing committal and the commencement of a warrant trial reinforced the mandatory character of supply where the applicable documentary safeguard arose, through a scheme which did not treat access as a discretionary favour dependent upon the accused establishing a complete defence first. The Court's use of these principles in the Special Court proceedings therefore required the accusation and its supporting material to be available in a meaningful way, while preserving the actual statutory distinctions concerning statements, documents and volume.

A list of unused material prevented the accused from remaining unaware of its existence

The Court separately considered the guidelines requiring the accused to receive a list of statements, documents, material objects and exhibits which the investigating officer did not rely upon, through a disclosure obligation distinct from immediate supply of every item on the list. The purpose of the list was to prevent the prosecution's selection from keeping the accused unaware of potentially useful material, because an accused could not reasonably seek production of a document whose existence remained concealed within the investigative file.

The guidelines had identified the possibility that unused material might be exculpatory or otherwise assist the defence, through a concern which required the agency to disclose its existence even though the material did not form part of the prosecution's chosen evidence. The list therefore enabled an informed application at the appropriate stage, through a process in which the accused could identify the material sought and explain why production was necessary for a proper and just trial.

The Court relied upon the reaffirmation of this requirement in Manoj, where compliance in criminal trials was treated as a responsibility of the prosecution and the presiding court, through an approach which prevented the disclosure obligation from depending upon whether the accused happened to discover the unused material independently. The Directorate's reliance upon the distinction between a list and copies was consequently correct only insofar as it identified different obligations, because the right to a list did not mean that copies or production could never be ordered when the appropriate legal basis arose.

The Court's reasoning preserved both sides of the distinction, since awareness through the list was required while the stage and power governing an application for the actual material still needed examination. This approach avoided an unlimited initial right to every collected document without leaving unused material permanently beyond the reach of the defence, through a sequence which combined disclosure of existence with a later application directed to legitimate use.

The list extended beyond documents alone because statements, objects and exhibits could also matter to the defence, although the form of the later production request depended upon the nature of the material and the applicable procedural provision. The Court therefore rejected the view that disclosure of a list exhausted the accused's rights, because the list was designed precisely to support an informed request for material which could assist the defence when the law permitted that request.

The ordinary charge inquiry did not become a trial of the defence

The Court examined Debendra Nath Padhi to determine the limits upon a request for documents at the stage of discharge and framing charge, through an authority which treated the record for that purpose as the prosecution case and the documents submitted with it. The accused did not ordinarily have a right to introduce separate defence material at that stage, because the court's task concerned whether sufficient ground existed to proceed rather than a final determination of competing accounts through a complete evidentiary trial.

The requirement that a document be necessary or desirable under Section 91 accordingly took its meaning from the stage and purpose of the request, because material intended to establish the defence might become relevant to production later without being part of the charge record at the outset. The Court preserved that principle in money laundering complaints by identifying the complaint and documents produced with it or with supplementary complaints as the material considered for framing charge, rather than allowing the accused to enlarge the inquiry with every unused investigative item.

This limitation did not require the prosecution to withhold copies of documents already falling within a separate entitlement, because the question whether the accused possessed a copy remained distinct from the question whether the document could be used to resist charge. The Court therefore could require copies of seized records and complaint material while maintaining the ordinary rule concerning the charge record, through an interpretation which prevented an entitlement at one stage from automatically changing the evidentiary scope of another.

The requirement also did not mean that the court had to adjudicate guilt from the complaint material, because the charge inquiry applied the standard appropriate to deciding whether the case should proceed rather than the final standard governing conviction. The judgment's treatment of production was thus sensitive to procedural function, since the same document might be unavailable for a defence contest at charge consideration but become important when the accused entered upon defence evidence or sought relief in a bail hearing governed by a distinct burden.

The Court's reference to an ordinary restriction was important because the authority did not state an absolute prohibition against every application before defence evidence, through wording which allowed the legal basis and circumstances of a request to be examined rather than treating stage as a label which answered every question. The decision consequently preserved judicial evaluation where appropriate without turning the limited charge inquiry into a general opportunity to collect and weigh all possible defence evidence.

Earlier authorities had to be understood within their statutory and procedural settings

The Court considered the Constitution Bench decision in L R Melwani within the earlier Code of Criminal Procedure, through a dispute in which the supply provision concerning police reports did not apply to proceedings instituted upon a complaint. The historical change in procedure mattered because the amendment had altered the inquiry in police report cases while leaving the complaint route with an opportunity to examine and cross examine prosecution witnesses before charge, through a difference which explained the earlier allocation of documentary rights.

The Court therefore did not regard the absence of the police report benefit in that setting as a legislative oversight which could be corrected indirectly through the general power to summon documents. The earlier authority had also considered an omnibus request made before prosecution evidence began, through circumstances in which the trial court had a prosecutor's assurance that relevant statements would be available when the witnesses were examined and no reason to believe that the material would disappear.

The discretion exercised in refusing that request was upheld within those circumstances, through reasoning which cautioned against routine appellate interference with the trial court's management of document production. Sarla Gupta distinguished that historical question from the modern provisions and from the accused's right to seek production at the stage of leading defence evidence, because the earlier decision had not considered the precise protections and stage now under examination.

The Court did not need to deny the authority of Melwani to make that distinction, since understanding its issue and statutory setting explained why it did not foreclose the later defence entitlement. A statement that one old supply provision did not apply to a complaint could not therefore answer whether the contemporary Code and Article 21 permitted production of material needed for defence in the Special Court proceedings. The distinction maintained the proper role of precedent while preventing an observation concerning one procedural route from becoming a universal denial of access across different stages and statutory arrangements.

A broad production power still takes its meaning from the purpose of the request

The Court considered Om Prakash Sharma as another authority addressing a request before framing charge, through reasoning which recognised broad powers under Section 91 while requiring necessity or desirability to be assessed according to the proceeding's stage. The existence of the power did not mean that the accused possessed a concretised entitlement to every requested document merely upon asking, because the court needed to consider the task then before it and avoid a roving inquiry into the evidence as though the trial had already occurred.

The Court acknowledged that compelling material could in an appropriate setting affect the sustainability of proceedings, although the fact that a court exercised its power in one case did not create a compulsory practice applicable to every request. Sarla Gupta drew from that authority the ordinary limitation at charge consideration, while distinguishing the stage of entering defence where the statute supplied a stronger and specifically expressed right to compulsory process.

The reference to Nitya Dharmananda supported the charge stage analysis, through a use which did not convert the authority into a conclusion that an accused could never obtain unused documents during trial. The Court also distinguished the question considered in Arjun Panditrao concerning production of a documentary certificate at a later stage, through an authority which required a balance protecting the accused against serious prejudice rather than deciding the same initial access issue raised in these appeals.

A decision concerning the Directorate's summons powers in Abhishek Banerjee was likewise not determinative, because the power of an investigating agency to summon a person or documents differed from the court's power to require production for the accused's defence. These distinctions kept the cited authorities attached to the questions they answered, through an approach which prevented references to broad investigative power or trial management discretion from displacing the statutory rights directly relevant to the document requests.

A delayed request did not automatically extinguish fair access

The Court considered V K Sasikala in relation to documents which had been forwarded to the court but not marked or exhibited, through a case where the request arose after prosecution cross examination had already progressed and the accused sought access to understand whether other papers could explain the apparently incriminating material. The concern in that authority was not merely formal compliance with an initial supply obligation, because the accused identified a possible handicap in answering the case through documents available in the court's custody.

The Court recognised that a reasonable perception of prejudice could arise at different times for different accused persons, through a qualification which prevented earlier failure to request a document from being treated as automatic forfeiture of the right to seek it when its significance became apparent. The prosecution and court could not simply decide that the accused should experience no difficulty without allowing the accused to examine material upon which the asserted difficulty reasonably depended, because the fairness of the defence required an opportunity to investigate the explanation sought.

The request had to have a reasonable basis, although its timing did not alone supply a reason to reject it where access to the material could address a real concern before trial concluded. Sarla Gupta relied upon this analysis as part of the broader right to a fair trial, through reasoning which prevented the ordinary limitation at charge consideration from becoming a permanent bar to later access during the proceedings.

The Court distinguished a request made to expand the charge record from a request made to explain evidence actually deployed against the accused, because the procedural purpose and the material then before the court could differ substantially. Requiring the accused to wait until the entire trial ended before testing the alleged prejudice would defeat the opportunity to meet the prosecution while the evidence could still be examined and answered, through a consequence inconsistent with meaningful defence.

The case therefore supported attention to when the need emerged and what the documents could address, rather than a rule under which every request made after initial supply was necessarily too late. This reasoning did not compel acceptance of every assertion of prejudice without scrutiny, because the perceived difficulty still required a reasonable connection with the evidence and the documents sought, but it placed the fairness question at the centre of the assessment.

Fair disclosure remained a responsibility of the prosecution and court

The discussion of Manu Sharma within the authorities examined by the Court emphasised that a prosecutor's role extended beyond securing punishment, through an obligation to promote fairness and ensure that relevant facts and circumstances were available for a just determination of the truth. The investigating agency and the court likewise bore responsibility for maintaining a fair process which did not erode freedom except according to law, through a principle which informed access to material without treating the prosecution's selection as the sole measure of relevance.

Documents submitted before the court had to be supplied according to the applicable scheme, while the possibility of summoning further material remained governed by the statutory requirements and the accused's defence rights. The Court's reasoning nevertheless distinguished fair disclosure from an indefeasible claim to every document in the police file, because the statutory structure contained defined rights and limitations which required a particular basis for obtaining material beyond the compulsory initial supply.

A document collected in good faith and bearing upon the truth of the prosecution could require disclosure in the interests of justice, through an assessment which recognised that the accused's ability to answer might depend upon material which the agency had not chosen to exhibit. The protection of specified portions under a lawful court order remained a different question, since the fair disclosure principle did not permit the accused to bypass the limits which the Code actually authorised.

The Court also did not equate the domestic prosecutor's duties with every feature of disclosure under another legal system, because the analysis remained grounded in the Indian statutory scheme and the constitutional requirement of a fair opportunity to defend. This combination preserved a limited but substantial right, through a position in which the accused could not demand unrestricted possession of the entire file but could not be denied material falling within the codified rights or properly required to avoid an unfair handicap.

The distinction mattered in the appeals because the appellants' claims included particular missing and illegible complaint documents and their own seized records, through categories which could not be dismissed by invoking a general objection to unlimited disclosure. The Court therefore required the actual basis of each request to be examined, rather than treating the broadest formulation advanced by the appellants as a reason to refuse narrower rights which the statutes independently protected.

The defence stage carried a stronger right to compulsory process

The Court examined Section 233 governing entry upon defence in a sessions trial, through a provision which called upon the accused to adduce supporting evidence where the accused had not been acquitted at the preceding stage. Where the accused applied for process compelling the attendance of a witness or production of a document or thing, the provision required the Judge to issue the process unless refusal was justified upon the limited grounds specified and supported by recorded reasons.

The grounds concerned vexation, delay or defeating the ends of justice, through a confined basis for refusal which differed materially from a general discretion to deny production because the prosecution did not intend to rely upon the item. The Court contrasted this mandatory formulation with the discretionary wording of Section 91, because the right to present a defence required a stronger protection when the accused was actually called upon to lead evidence.

At that stage, the court could not treat the accused's request as merely an optional invitation to exercise a broad power without regard to the specifically protected right, since the legislature had directed that process issue unless one of the stated reasons for refusal existed. The Court also examined the parallel provision governing defence evidence in warrant cases before Magistrates, through a comparison which demonstrated the statutory recognition of compulsory process while preserving the procedural distinctions applicable to the different trials.

The sessions provision was directly relevant to the money laundering Special Court because the legislation required the trial to proceed according to the Code's provisions governing a Court of Session, through a route which brought Section 233 into the proceedings without requiring an independent inherent power. The Directorate's assertion that the Special Court lacked the High Court's inherent authority therefore did not answer the claim, because the power and obligation arose from a statutory provision made applicable to the trial.

The Court found no inconsistent provision in the money laundering enactment which displaced that defence right, through a conclusion which preserved the statutory safeguards alongside the special offence rather than assuming that the special character of the prosecution removed them. The accused could accordingly seek a document or thing held by the prosecution even though it had not been produced, while the same protection extended to material in the possession or custody of a third party whose production could be compelled through the relevant process.

This entitlement did not require the prosecution to adopt the material as its own evidence, because the provision served the accused's opportunity to present a defence and therefore addressed material which the prosecution might choose not to rely upon. The right also remained subject to the specified refusal grounds, through a safeguard which allowed the court to prevent misuse without treating every request as necessarily obstructive merely because it might take time to obtain the material. The requirement of recorded reasons made the decision accountable, because the court had to identify why the particular application fell within a permitted ground rather than reject it through a broad statement that unused material was outside the case.

Effective defence included the ability to examine prosecution witnesses upon later produced documents

The Court recognised that production of a document at the defence stage could disclose matters upon which an already examined prosecution witness needed to be questioned, through a situation in which access alone would be inadequate if the accused could not test the witness's account against the newly available material. The accused could therefore apply under Section 311 to recall the witness for further cross examination, through a power which served the effective exercise of defence rather than forcing the accused to accept that the opportunity had ended before the relevant document became available.

The right to effective cross examination formed part of the fair trial guarantee, because a defence could depend upon confronting a witness with material whose significance was not accessible during the first examination. The Court expressly recognised that the application could be made even after the evidence of both sides had closed, through a clarification which prevented closure alone from being treated as an absolute bar to considering a request necessary for meaningful defence.

This recognition did not declare that every recall application must automatically succeed, since the request remained an application under the statutory power and required consideration according to law, but it preserved the availability of the procedure where later production created the need. The relation between production and recall was important to the Court's reasoning because disclosure could otherwise become a formal entitlement without practical effect, through a process in which the accused received a paper but was denied a lawful means of examining the testimony which it addressed.

The judgment accordingly treated defence evidence and further cross examination as connected elements of the opportunity to answer the case, rather than independent procedural events whose rigid sequencing could defeat the purpose of the document right. Where the accused believed that a witness or the prosecution withheld a document, questions could also be put during cross examination concerning willingness to produce it, through a means of establishing the circumstances relevant to a later submission about nonproduction.

The accused could argue at the final hearing for an adverse inference under the evidentiary provision governing withheld material, although the availability of that argument did not mean that every refusal automatically established the inference or decided the entire prosecution. The Court thus preserved both compulsory production where the statutory conditions applied and an evidentiary response where nonproduction remained unexplained, through mechanisms which enabled the defence to address a missing document without requiring the court to assume its contents in advance.

The general Code and the special enactment had to be read together

The Court relied upon the reasoning in Bibhu Prasad Acharya concerning Sections 65 and 71, through an authority which explained that a Code provision made applicable because it was consistent with the money laundering legislation could not then be excluded merely by invoking the enactment's general overriding clause. Section 65 expressly incorporated the Code wherever no inconsistency existed, while Section 71 gave priority to the special enactment in the event of inconsistency, through provisions whose operation required a real conflict rather than an automatic preference for special legislation in every procedural matter.

If the overriding clause removed every incorporated Code protection, the incorporation clause would become redundant, through an interpretation which the Court rejected because each part of the statutory scheme needed meaningful operation. The Court therefore examined Sections 91 and 233 for inconsistency and found no money laundering provision which displaced them, through a conclusion preserving the court's production power and the accused's defence process.

The discussion of the earlier authority's sanction issue supplied the interpretative principle rather than a new finding about sanction in these appeals, because the present applications concerned documents and the relevant question was how the same statutory relationship affected their production. This method prevented the special character of the offence from becoming a general answer to every procedural safeguard, since an actual inconsistency had to be identified before the ordinary provision could be excluded. The result was a coherent reading in which special burdens and powers remained effective while consistent procedural protections also remained available, through an arrangement which the Court considered necessary for a fair prosecution under the enactment.

The burden under Section 24 made meaningful defence production particularly important

The Court examined Section 24 because it placed a substantial burden upon a person charged with money laundering, through a statutory presumption concerning proceeds of crime whose operation required the accused to have a genuine opportunity to present the answer contemplated by the law. The constitutional validity of that provision had been upheld in Vijay Madanlal upon the basis that the accused could rebut the presumption, through an opportunity which could not remain merely theoretical if documents necessary to the defence were inaccessible in the prosecution's custody.

The Court therefore considered it especially important to construe the defence process under Section 233 liberally in favour of the accused, because the statutory burden increased the practical importance of being able to obtain witnesses and records capable of answering the case. The existence of the presumption did not supply a reason to narrow defence access, since that approach would retain the adverse burden while undermining the means through which its constitutional justification expected the accused to discharge it.

A refusal to compel production of a relevant document in the Directorate's or a third party's custody could prevent the accused from addressing the presumption, through a consequence which the Court treated as a reason to protect the valuable defence right rather than to regard the prosecution's custody as decisive. The Court did not invalidate Section 24 or convert the document appeal into a new adjudication of its constitutional validity, because its reasoning concerned preserving the opportunity to rebut within the existing statutory arrangement.

The distinction mattered because the grant of access supported the lawful functioning of the burden instead of abolishing it, through an interpretation which maintained the special provision while ensuring that the accused could exercise the defence which the law recognised. The Court also did not decide that any particular document necessarily rebutted the presumption in these appeals, since the documents' contents and probative significance remained for the trial and the applications governing their use.

The reasoning therefore justified the availability and protection of process without prejudging whether the accused's eventual explanation would succeed, through a division between procedural opportunity and substantive outcome which remained central throughout the judgment. The requirement that refusal fall within the limited statutory grounds continued to operate, although the substantial burden supplied an additional reason why those grounds could not be enlarged into a discretionary refusal based merely upon the Directorate's decision not to use the material. The Court's analysis connected the intensity of the burden with the strength of the procedural safeguard, because an onerous obligation upon the accused required a meaningful chance to obtain the evidence through which an answer could be given.

The bail stage presented a different purpose from framing charge

Section 45 imposed conditions governing release where the prosecution opposed the bail application, through a statutory inquiry requiring reasonable grounds for believing that the accused was not guilty and was not likely to commit an offence while on bail. The Court considered this an extraordinary burden at the stage of seeking liberty, because the accused had to place material before the Special Court capable of supporting the required satisfaction rather than rely only upon the ordinary position applicable to bail in a less restrictive regime.

The question whether production could be sought therefore arose for a purpose distinct from introducing defence material to enlarge the charge record, through a difference which made the ordinary charge stage restriction an inadequate answer to the bail request. A document not relied upon by the Directorate might bear upon the reasonable grounds relevant to release, although the accused could not meaningfully invoke that material if access were denied solely because the prosecution did not choose to include it in the complaint.

The Court consequently held that the accused must be permitted to invoke Section 91 to seek production of unused documents during a bail hearing governed by the stringent provision, through an opportunity necessary to address the burden affecting liberty. Denial of that opportunity could prevent the accused from discharging the statutory burden and thereby contribute to denial of bail, through a consequence which the Court considered inconsistent with Article 21 if the procedural power were read too narrowly.

The judgment did not thereby grant bail to the appellants or hold that every requested document established reasonable grounds for release, because the appeal concerned the availability of production and the safeguards governing it rather than a final bail assessment upon those documents. The production application remained directed to material relevant to the purpose for which the power was invoked, through a requirement arising from Section 91's consideration of necessity or desirability rather than an unlimited right to obtain the entire investigative file at a bail hearing.

The Court's reasoning also remained connected with bail applications to which the stringent conditions applied, because the statute contained its own qualifications and exceptions whose existence prevented the discussion from being read as an identical burden in every conceivable application. The comparison with the trial burden clarified the relationship between the two stages, since Section 24 affected the accused's answer at trial while Section 45 created a particular need to place material before the court when seeking release. Both required meaningful procedural access for their respective purposes, although the power exercised and the stage of assessment differed, through an arrangement which the judgment preserved instead of treating all requests for documents as one undifferentiated claim.

The Directorate could identify prejudice to a continuing investigation

The Court recognised that production during an ongoing investigation or further investigation could expose material in a manner prejudicial to the inquiry, through a qualification which preserved legitimate investigative needs while rejecting an automatic refusal whenever the agency stated that investigation continued. The Directorate could resist production upon that ground, although the objection had to concern the effect of disclosing the documents sought rather than merely repeat the existence of an unfinished investigation as a conclusive formula.

The documents had to be shown to the court, through a safeguard which enabled the Judge to assess the asserted prejudice from the actual material instead of deciding only from a general description advanced by the agency. The court could deny production where examination satisfied it that disclosure at that stage might prejudice the continuing investigation, through a conclusion which required reasons to be recorded rather than an unexplained acceptance of the prosecution's opposition.

This procedure placed the protective decision with the court, because the Directorate's right to object did not amount to an exclusive authority to decide whether the accused could see material needed to address the bail burden. The requirement of inspection by the Judge supplied an informed basis for balancing liberty and investigative protection, through a method which prevented the accused's inability to know withheld contents from making the agency's objection effectively unreviewable.

The Court therefore preserved a specific ground of withholding within the bail production process, rather than treating the right to seek material as either absolute disclosure or complete deference to the investigation. Once the investigation was complete, the Directorate could no longer rely upon the same continuing-investigation objection, because the justification depended upon prejudice to an inquiry whose continuation made the timing of disclosure material.

The limitation did not require the court to assume that all material became automatically admissible after completion, since the issue concerned the particular objection to production and the ordinary requirements governing relevance and use remained separate. Where further investigation was actually in progress, the Court's reasoning accommodated the same need for a demonstrated prejudice assessment, through a qualification which prevented the filing of a complaint from being treated as proof that no investigation could remain while also preventing further investigation from becoming a blanket denial of access. The result required the parties and court to distinguish the state of the inquiry from the content and effect of the disclosure sought, because a label describing the proceeding did not alone establish that the particular documents would cause the asserted harm.

The special burden did not withdraw the fair trial guarantee

The Court placed its interpretation within the development of Article 21, recognising that changes in criminal legislation and the problems addressed by money laundering law did not justify a return to a narrow understanding of the accused's procedural protections. The legislative response to contemporary forms of crime could include substantial burdens and special powers, although the Court's duty remained to interpret the applicable provisions so that the right to a fair trial was not removed by the severity of those measures.

The purpose of Sections 24 and 45 was not to abolish the fundamental opportunity to defend, through an understanding which required the procedural powers to remain effective precisely because the accused faced an unusually demanding statutory position. The Court's reference to constitutional interpretation keeping pace with changing social needs therefore supported protection of meaningful defence alongside effective legislation, rather than an assumption that modern crime required courts to disregard the practical effect of withholding records.

The constitutional analysis did not establish that every investigative confidentiality claim was invalid, because the Court expressly protected a continuing investigation where the material and reasons demonstrated prejudice. Nor did it establish that every defence assertion controlled the court, because applications still operated within the provisions governing their stage and purpose, through limits which the judgment retained while refusing to construe them so narrowly that the opportunity to answer became ineffective.

The Court consequently linked fair trial with concrete procedural functions, including receiving complaint documents, knowing what unused material existed, obtaining defence process and seeking documents needed for the stringent bail inquiry. The right was thus implemented through the powers and duties already available within the statutory scheme, rather than a general declaration which left the accused without a practical means to obtain or use the material concerned.

Legibility and completeness were substantive features of access

The first appeal demonstrated why the obligation to supply documents could not be measured solely by the physical size of the bundle delivered, because the appellants identified particular missing and illegible items within material which the prosecution had already placed before the court. A document could be included nominally in a volume while failing to provide usable information if its contents could not be read, through an omission in substance which the Court addressed by directing soft or legible copies rather than treating possession of an unreadable sheet as adequate compliance.

The comparison with the court file also mattered because some material was readable there while the copies given to the appellants were not, through a difference which showed that the problem did not necessarily concern the nonexistence of the original but the failure to furnish an effective copy. Missing material and duplicated numbering similarly required attention to the actual correspondence between the supplied bundle and the court record, because a general statement that all relied upon material had been supplied did not answer a specific identification of deficiencies.

The appellants did not have to show that each missing document would conclusively defeat the prosecution before obtaining a copy which formed part of the complaint material, since the entitlement existed so that the accused could assess and answer that material in the first place. Requiring a prior demonstration of exculpatory quality could invert the purpose of disclosure, because an accused unable to read or obtain the item would be asked to establish its significance before having the means to examine its contents.

The Court's order therefore restored the opportunity to understand the case without making any finding that the missing or illegible documents necessarily contained an answer favourable to the appellants. The availability of electronic copies accommodated practical volume while preserving that opportunity, through a method which respected both the extensive nature of the documentary prosecution and the accused's need for material whose contents could actually be used.

This approach distinguished a legitimate practical arrangement from a substantive denial, because the means of supply could vary while the obligation to provide an accurate and legible account of the document remained effective. The Court's reasoning consequently required the agency and Special Court to attend to the identified category and state of the document, rather than dismiss an application through a general observation that an economic investigation commonly generated many papers of differing relevance.

The two appeals involved different legal sources of entitlement

The first appeal principally concerned material produced with the complaint and the complaint proceedings, through an entitlement grounded in the accused's right to receive the accusation and the documents forming the basis upon which the Special Court proceeded. The second appeal concerned records and documents taken from the accused's premises, through an entitlement grounded in the seizure and retention provisions even where the Directorate did not select the documents for use in its complaint.

These categories could overlap in practice because a seized document might also become complaint material, although the Court did not require that overlap as a condition of granting copies in the second appeal. The distinction mattered to the Directorate's argument about reliance, because the selection of a seized record could not determine the right to a copy arising under the seizure provisions, while production within the complaint proceedings could itself prevent the agency from later denying supply by calling the item unused.

The Court accordingly identified the statutory basis before considering the objection, through a method which prevented the same phrase about unrelied documents from being used to reject claims which arose for materially different reasons. The ordinary restriction at charge consideration remained relevant to the proposed use of defence material, although it did not extinguish either entitlement to copies, through a separation which explained how the Court could allow both appeals without altering the proper scope of the charge inquiry.

The rights concerning a list of other material, compulsory defence process and bail production then addressed categories beyond these immediate copy claims, through further safeguards whose exercise depended upon their own stages and conditions. The judgment therefore offered a structured set of distinctions rather than a single rule that all documents must always be supplied at every stage, because the legal source, possession, production history and procedural purpose each affected the answer.

This structure also prevented the opposite conclusion that only documents chosen by the Directorate could ever be obtained, since the statutory seizure right and the defence process expressly reached material outside that selection. The Court's reasoning preserved both the legitimate limits of the initial charge inquiry and the broader opportunity to defend, through an approach which required the judge to identify which question an application actually presented.

A request for access was not a determination of evidentiary admissibility

The right to receive or seek production of a document did not by itself decide whether the document proved the proposition asserted by the accused, because access enabled examination while admissibility, weight and effect remained matters for the appropriate evidentiary process. The Court's discussion of later production and recall recognised this distinction by identifying procedures through which the material could be tested, rather than treating receipt of a copy as an immediate adjudication that the defence was correct.

The list of unused material likewise established knowledge of what the agency held but did not certify that every item was exculpatory, through a disclosure function whose importance lay in enabling the accused to make an informed request rather than prejudging the request's ultimate effect. The right to copies of seized records was especially clear on this point, because it arose from the person's relationship to the seized material and did not depend upon a judicial conclusion about its relevance to guilt or innocence.

The Court could therefore direct supply even though the accused could not ordinarily use unused papers to expand the charge record, through a position which would be contradictory only if receipt and evidentiary use were incorrectly treated as identical. The same separation applied to the bail context because production supplied an opportunity to address the stringent conditions, while the court still had to assess whether the material supported the satisfaction required for release.

The ongoing-investigation safeguard also concerned timing of disclosure rather than a finding that the document was false or legally irrelevant, since the court could withhold production upon demonstrated prejudice without making a final merits determination of its contents. By preserving these distinctions, the judgment avoided turning a procedural appeal into a premature trial of the alleged money laundering, through a limitation which was reflected in the actual orders directing documents rather than quashing the substantive complaints.

Judicial supervision supplied the answer to the objection about power

The Directorate's objection that the Special Court lacked inherent powers did not defeat the rights identified by the Court, because the relevant obligations arose through the seizure provisions, the complaint process and the ordinary Code provisions which the special enactment made applicable where consistent. The Special Court consequently did not need to assume an unexpressed jurisdiction equivalent to the High Court's inherent power merely to direct performance of a statutory copy obligation or issue process which the defence provision required.

The court's role also extended to ensuring the list of unused material was supplied and to examining a claim that disclosure during investigation would cause prejudice, through functions which depended upon judicial scrutiny rather than the unilateral assessment of the agency. This division preserved the Directorate's legitimate ability to investigate and oppose disclosure on the specified basis, while ensuring that the opposition was considered within a legal framework protecting the accused's opportunity to answer.

The interlocutory character of a refusal did not transform a denial of the recognised entitlement into a decision beyond correction, because the appeals demonstrated that the lower courts' stage-based reasoning had overlooked the distinction between access and use. The Supreme Court's intervention therefore addressed an error concerning the applicable rights and powers, rather than a routine substitution of preference concerning how many documents should be inspected or copied. The correction did not require a finding of deliberate suppression by the agency, since the statutory obligations could be enforced upon the identified deficiencies without deciding that officials had acted with an improper motive.

The corresponding procedural provisions did not change the distinctions identified

The judgment identified corresponding provisions in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita when explaining the Code's document and defence safeguards, through references which situated the reasoning within the procedural transition without treating that transition as a reason to abolish the underlying protections. The provisions corresponding to supply of documents were identified as Sections 230 and 231, while the power concerning production of documents was identified as Section 94, through an explanation which maintained the distinction between compulsory initial supply and a production request assessed according to its purpose and stage.

The sessions defence provision was identified as Section 256, including the mandatory process safeguard whose limited refusal grounds formed the centre of the Court's explanation of meaningful defence. The corresponding recall provision was identified as Section 348, through a reference which preserved the procedural means of seeking further examination upon documents obtained after an earlier witness had already testified.

The Court also identified the corresponding provision in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam concerning the inference from withheld material, through a reference to Section 119 which explained the continued availability of the evidentiary argument rather than an automatic finding against the prosecution. These references did not convert every statement about the earlier Code into an assertion that all pending cases immediately followed the newer procedure, because the judgment's analysis concerned the safeguards and their counterparts rather than deciding a separate transitional dispute in each prosecution.

The accused's rights still required identification of the applicable proceeding and provision, although the existence of corresponding safeguards reinforced that the court's reasoning did not depend upon regarding the special complaint as outside every ordinary procedural protection. The continuity identified by the Court therefore concerned functions such as supply, production, defence and recall, through mechanisms whose distinct purposes remained significant whichever corresponding provision governed the particular stage.

The court's reasons had to address the ground actually permitting refusal

The judgment required reasons to be connected with the specific statutory basis for refusing a request, because a statement that the document was not relied upon could not answer an application arising from the right to copies of seized records or from the mandatory defence process. At the defence stage, the court needed to consider the limited grounds of vexation, delay or defeating justice, through an assessment which could not be replaced by a general preference to confine the accused to the prosecution's chosen evidence.

During a bail hearing involving continuing investigation, the court needed to examine whether disclosure would prejudice that inquiry, through a distinct ground which required inspection of the material and an explanation of the conclusion rather than a formula that investigation remained pending. Where the application concerned complaint documents already before the court, the question was whether the copies required by the complaint process had been supplied, through an obligation which did not permit a refusal merely because the court expected the accused to wait for another stage.

Where the application concerned seized documents belonging to the person seeking copies, the entitlement arose from the statutory relationship to the material, through a basis which the court had to recognise regardless of whether the agency intended to rely upon it. The judgment's insistence upon these different reasons prevented judicial discretion from becoming a single undefined power to refuse all access, because discretion could operate only within the legal question and conditions governing the particular application. The corresponding duty to identify the request accurately also protected the investigation from an unnecessarily broad order, since the court could enforce the actual entitlement while preserving limits which concerned other categories or uses of material.

Decision

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals and set aside the impugned decisions, through separate orders addressing complaint material in the first appeal and documents seized from the accused's premises in the second. In the first appeal, the Court held that the appellants were entitled to copies of documents produced with the money laundering complaint and directed the Directorate to provide soft or legible copies of all such documents which had not already been supplied, within one month of the judgment.

In the second appeal, the Court directed supply of true copies of the documents seized from the accused's premises within the same period, while permitting electronic copies as a practical means of complying with the direction. The Court held more generally that seized records and instruments or documents of title remained accessible to the person from whom they were taken, because retention did not extinguish the copy entitlement or vest the material in the Directorate.

The complaint-copy requirement extended to the documents and statements forming the basis of cognizance and to corresponding supplementary material, while a list of other statements, documents, objects and exhibits not relied upon had to be furnished to enable an informed request at the appropriate stage. The Court preserved the ordinary rule that charge consideration concerned the prosecution record rather than separate defence material, although the accused's later entitlement to compulsory process at the defence stage remained protected by the mandatory provision and its limited grounds for refusal.

The opportunity to seek recall for further cross examination upon documents obtained during defence remained available under the relevant Code provision, even where evidence had closed, while nonproduction could support a properly founded argument for an adverse inference at the final hearing. For bail hearings governed by the stringent conditions of Section 45, the accused could invoke the document production power to seek unused material, subject to a continuing-investigation objection which the court could accept only after examining the documents and recording reasons concerning demonstrated prejudice. The orders granted access and production-related relief rather than bail or an adjudication of innocence, because the complaints, evidentiary effect of the documents and substantive allegations remained for determination through the appropriate criminal proceedings.

Source: Sarla Gupta and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement · 2025 INSC 645