How can a senior police constable seek quashing of criminal proceedings in the Punjab and Haryana High Court when the alleged false register entry was made while on duty and the limitation period has passed?

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Suppose a senior constable attached to a district police outpost records the seizure of a small quantity of narcotics during a routine traffic stop and later prepares a register entry that, according to the prosecution, misstates the amount seized, thereby shielding the actual possessor from detection.

The constable is subsequently charged under the provision of the Indian Penal Code that penalises making a false entry in an official register. In his defence, he relies on a procedural rule that requires prior permission from a senior officer before any register entry is made, and he also invokes a statutory limitation provision that bars prosecution against a police officer for acts done “under colour of duty” if the complaint is filed more than six months after the alleged act.

During the trial, the court accepts the prosecution’s evidence that the register entry was deliberately altered on the day following the seizure, and it rejects the procedural‑rule defence on the ground that the rule is not a statutory requirement. The constable is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. He then files an appeal, arguing that the limitation provision should apply because the alleged false entry was made while he was exercising his statutory duty, and that the prosecution was instituted well beyond the six‑month period prescribed by the limitation clause.

The appellate court, however, holds that the limitation provision does not extend to offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code and that the “under colour of duty” test is not satisfied because the alleged act was not performed in the exercise of official authority. The constable’s conviction is upheld, leaving him with no effective remedy at the trial level.

At this juncture, the constable’s legal team recognises that an ordinary factual defence is insufficient; the core issue is whether the limitation provision, which is a statutory shield for police officers, can be invoked to bar the prosecution altogether. The only avenue to obtain a definitive determination on this point is to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which possesses inherent jurisdiction to entertain a petition for quashing of criminal proceedings on the ground of statutory limitation.

Consequently, the constable files a petition under the inherent powers of the court, invoking Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, seeking to have the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings dismissed as time‑barred. The petition argues that the alleged false entry was made “under colour of duty,” that the limitation period of six months had elapsed before the FIR was lodged, and that the prosecution therefore contravenes the statutory protection afforded to police officers.

In support of the petition, the constable’s counsel cites the statutory language of the limitation clause, emphasising that the term “offence” encompasses any act punishable under any law, including the Indian Penal Code. The petition also points out that the procedural rule cited by the prosecution is merely an internal guideline and cannot override the statutory limitation. The filing of this petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court is essential because only the High Court can interpret the scope of the limitation provision and decide whether the High Court’s inherent powers can be exercised to quash the proceedings.

A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court prepares the petition, meticulously drafting the factual matrix, the legal grounds, and the relief sought. The petition is presented before a bench that includes judges experienced in criminal‑law procedural matters, ensuring that the argument on “under colour of duty” receives a thorough examination.

During the hearing, the counsel for the prosecution contends that the limitation provision should not apply to offences under the Indian Penal Code and that the High Court’s inherent powers cannot be used to override a conviction affirmed by the appellate court. The constable’s counsel, however, relies on precedent where the Supreme Court held that the limitation provision does extend to offences punishable under any statute when the act is performed in the exercise of official duty.

Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court have observed similar disputes, noting that the High Court’s power to quash criminal proceedings on limitation grounds is well‑established, provided that the limitation is clear and unambiguous. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court once successfully argued that a police officer’s prosecution was barred by a six‑month limitation, reinforcing the principle that statutory shields for law‑enforcement officers must be respected.

After hearing both sides, the Punjab and Haryana High Court applies a two‑stage test: first, whether the alleged false entry was made “under colour of duty,” and second, whether the limitation period had expired at the time the FIR was lodged. The court finds that the constable, while performing his statutory duty of recording seizures, used the authority of that duty to conceal the true quantity of narcotics, thereby satisfying the “under colour of duty” criterion. Moreover, the FIR was filed more than six months after the alleged alteration, triggering the limitation bar.

Accordingly, the court exercises its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR, directing the prosecution to stand down. The judgment underscores that the limitation provision is applicable to offences under the Indian Penal Code when the act is performed in the exercise of official authority, and it reaffirms the High Court’s power to prevent the continuation of time‑barred criminal proceedings.

This outcome illustrates why the remedy lay before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than through a routine appeal. The procedural posture required a direct challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings on a statutory limitation ground, a matter squarely within the High Court’s jurisdiction to entertain a petition for quashing. The specific proceeding— a petition under Section 482 CrPC—naturally followed from the legal analysis, providing a definitive resolution to the constable’s predicament.

Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court continue to advise police officers facing similar prosecutions to promptly assess the applicability of limitation provisions and, where appropriate, to file a petition for quashing before the High Court to safeguard their statutory protections.

Question: Does the statutory limitation provision that shields police officers from prosecution after six months apply to an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code when the alleged act was performed while the officer was exercising his official duty?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the senior constable altered a seizure register after a routine traffic stop and that the alleged false entry was made in the course of recording a seizure, an act that falls squarely within his statutory duty to document seized contraband. The legal problem therefore centres on the construction of the limitation provision, which uses the language “offence” without limiting it to offences arising under the police act. The High Court must interpret whether the term embraces any penal consequence imposed by any law, including the Indian Penal Code. In the present case the prosecution relied on the offence of making a false entry in an official register, a provision of the penal code. The defence argues that because the act was performed “under colour of duty” the limitation provision should bar the prosecution irrespective of the penal statute under which the charge is framed. The procedural consequence of a broad interpretation is that the FIR and all subsequent proceedings would be dismissed as time‑barred, sparing the constable from further trial, custody or sentencing. Conversely, a narrow reading that restricts the provision to offences arising under the police act would leave the conviction intact and force the constable to pursue other remedies such as a revision petition, which is unlikely to succeed after affirmation by the appellate court. The practical implication for the complainant and the prosecution is that a declaration of limitation would extinguish the state’s claim, preserving the integrity of statutory safeguards for law‑enforcement officers. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would therefore stress the purposive approach to statutory construction, pointing to legislative intent to protect officers acting within the scope of their duties from protracted litigation. The High Court’s decision on this point will set a precedent for future cases involving police officers charged under penal statutes for conduct undertaken while on duty.

Question: How is the “under colour of duty” test satisfied by the constable’s alteration of the register entry, and what evidential standards must the court apply to determine the presence of this element?

Answer: The factual backdrop reveals that the constable seized a small quantity of narcotics, recorded the seizure in a register, and subsequently amended the entry to show a lower amount, thereby concealing the true quantity. The legal issue is whether this act constitutes conduct “under colour of duty,” a phrase that requires the use of official authority as a shield for dishonest conduct. The court must examine the statutory duty imposed on the constable to accurately record seizures and assess whether the alteration was performed while he was vested with that authority. Evidence such as the original register entry, the later amended entry, the timing of the amendment, and any statements by the constable or witnesses will be scrutinised. The evidential standard is the balance of probabilities, as the matter is a question of fact within a criminal proceeding that does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt for the element of “under colour of duty.” The High Court will also consider the intent behind the amendment; the fact that the constable deliberately reduced the recorded quantity indicates an intention to mislead, which satisfies the dishonest element. The procedural consequence of finding the element satisfied is that the limitation provision becomes applicable, triggering the time‑bar defence. If the court were to find that the amendment was made after the constable had ceased to be on duty, the element would fail and the limitation defence would be unavailable. For the prosecution, a finding that the element is not met would mean the case proceeds on its merits, potentially leading to reaffirmation of the conviction. For the defence, establishing the element paves the way for a quashing petition under the inherent powers of the court. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would argue that the constable’s official capacity was the very instrument used to conceal the truth, thereby meeting the statutory test and justifying the invocation of the limitation shield.

Question: What specific remedy does Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide for the constable, and how does the inherent jurisdiction of the Punjab and Haryana High Court operate to quash criminal proceedings on limitation grounds?

Answer: The procedural posture shows that ordinary appeal routes have been exhausted and the conviction remains in force. The constable therefore seeks a petition under the inherent powers of the court, invoking Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowers a High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any criminal proceeding. The legal problem is whether the court may exercise this jurisdiction to dismiss the FIR and all subsequent proceedings on the ground that the limitation period has expired. The High Court’s inherent jurisdiction is not a substantive right but a discretionary power exercised to safeguard the ends of justice. In this case the court must first ascertain that the limitation provision is clear, unambiguous and applicable to the offence, and then determine that the FIR was lodged after the six‑month period elapsed. If both conditions are satisfied, the court may deem the prosecution an abuse of process and quash it. The practical implication of a successful quash is that the constable is released from any further custodial or punitive consequences, and the prosecution is barred from re‑initiating the case. For the complainant and the investigating agency, the quash represents a final closure, preventing waste of resources on a time‑barred matter. The decision also serves as a precedent for future cases where police officers face charges for acts performed while on duty. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would highlight that the inherent jurisdiction is a vital tool to enforce statutory limitations and prevent the state from persisting with stale prosecutions, thereby reinforcing the balance between accountability and protection for law‑enforcement personnel.

Question: How does the internal police manual rule requiring prior permission for register entries affect the constable’s statutory limitation defence, and can a procedural guideline override a statutory protection?

Answer: The factual scenario indicates that the prosecution relied on a police manual rule that mandates senior officer permission before any register entry is made, arguing that the constable’s failure to obtain such permission invalidates his limitation claim. The legal issue is whether a non‑statutory procedural guideline can defeat a statutory defence that bars prosecution after a prescribed period. The court must examine the hierarchy of law, recognising that statutes and statutory provisions enjoy supremacy over internal rules that lack legislative backing. The limitation provision is a statutory shield expressly designed to protect officers acting in the performance of duty, and its operation is independent of procedural formalities. Consequently, the internal rule cannot nullify the limitation defence because it does not alter the substantive right conferred by the statute. The procedural consequence is that the court will treat the internal rule as evidence of administrative practice rather than a legal bar to the defence. For the constable, this means that the limitation argument remains viable regardless of the alleged breach of the manual rule. For the prosecution, the reliance on the internal rule will not succeed in overturning the statutory protection, and any attempt to do so may be viewed as an abuse of process. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would argue that allowing a procedural guideline to override a statutory right would undermine the rule of law and set a dangerous precedent whereby internal regulations could erode legislatively granted immunities. The practical implication is that the High Court is likely to dismiss the prosecution on limitation grounds, reinforcing the principle that statutory protections cannot be circumvented by internal procedural requirements.

Question: What are the broader implications of the High Court’s decision to quash the proceedings for future prosecutions of police officers, and how might this shape the conduct of investigating agencies and the drafting of police manuals?

Answer: The factual outcome shows that the Punjab and Haryana High Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to dismiss the FIR and all subsequent proceedings on the basis that the limitation period had expired and the act was performed under colour of duty. The legal problem extends beyond the individual case to the systemic impact on how prosecutions of police officers are approached. The decision establishes a clear precedent that statutory limitation provisions apply to offences arising under the penal code when the conduct is linked to official duties. Consequently, investigating agencies will need to ensure that complaints against officers are lodged within the prescribed period, otherwise the risk of dismissal under the limitation defence becomes significant. This may prompt agencies to adopt stricter timelines for filing FIRs and to conduct preliminary inquiries promptly. Moreover, the judgment underscores that internal procedural rules, such as those found in police manuals, cannot override statutory protections, prompting a review of manual provisions to align them with legislative intent. Police departments may revise manuals to include explicit references to statutory limitation periods and to clarify that failure to follow internal guidelines does not negate statutory defences. For the legal community, lawyers in Chandigarh High Court and lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court will likely advise officers to invoke the limitation defence early in the process, and to file pre‑emptive petitions under Section 482 where appropriate. The broader implication is a reinforcement of the balance between accountability and protection for law‑enforcement personnel, ensuring that prosecutions are pursued diligently while respecting the legislative safeguards designed to prevent undue harassment of officers performing their duties.

Question: Why is a petition for quashing the FIR the appropriate remedy before the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than a further appeal?

Answer: The factual matrix shows that the constable was convicted after the trial court and an appellate court affirmed the judgment. At that point the ordinary hierarchy of appeals is exhausted because the appellate court has already examined the merits of the case and rejected the limitation defence. The only remaining avenue to challenge the very existence of the criminal proceeding is to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the high court to prevent an abuse of process. The limitation provision that bars prosecution after a six month period is a statutory shield designed specifically for police officers acting in the discharge of duty. Because the question is whether the FIR and the subsequent prosecution are void ab initio, the matter is not a question of error in law or fact that can be corrected on appeal; it is a question of jurisdiction and the existence of a defence that defeats the prosecution altogether. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, as the superior court of record for the state, possesses the power under the Criminal Procedure Code to entertain a petition for quashing on the ground of time barred prosecution. This power is exercised sparingly and only when the high court is satisfied that the limitation provision applies and that the proceeding is otherwise oppressive. A further appeal would be futile because the appellate court has already ruled that the limitation does not apply, and the constable’s factual defence was rejected. By filing a petition for quashing, the constable seeks a declaration that the FIR is illegal and that the prosecution cannot continue. The involvement of a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court becomes essential to frame the petition, cite precedent on the scope of the limitation provision, and argue that the inherent power must be used to protect statutory rights. The procedural route therefore moves directly from conviction to a high court petition, bypassing any further appellate stage, because only the high court can determine the validity of the criminal process on limitation grounds.

Question: What procedural steps must the constable follow in filing the petition and how does the involvement of a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court become relevant?

Answer: The first step is to prepare a detailed petition that sets out the factual chronology, the alleged false entry, the date of the FIR and the date on which the limitation period expired. The petition must be filed in the registry of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and must be accompanied by a copy of the FIR, the conviction order and any relevant statutory provisions relating to the limitation defence. After filing, the court issues a notice to the prosecution and the investigating agency, inviting them to file a response. The constable must then be ready to appear for a hearing where the bench will consider whether the limitation provision is applicable and whether the inherent jurisdiction should be exercised. Throughout this process, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court will draft the petition, ensure compliance with filing fees, and argue the legal points before the bench. Simultaneously, the constable may seek advice from a lawyer in Chandigarh High Court because the same high court also serves as the venue for many police officers in neighboring districts who face similar limitation issues. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court have developed expertise in framing limitation arguments and can provide strategic guidance on precedent from that jurisdiction, which may be persuasive to the bench. Moreover, if the prosecution decides to challenge the jurisdiction of the high court or raise a preliminary objection, the constable may need to file a revision or a writ petition, and counsel familiar with Chandigarh High Court practice can assist in preparing those ancillary filings. The procedural route therefore involves careful drafting, filing, service of notice, and oral argument, all of which require the specialized knowledge of a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court and the strategic insight of lawyers in Chandigarh High Court to maximise the chance of a successful quashing.

Question: Why cannot the factual defence of lack of intent or reliance on internal rules succeed at this stage, and why must the limitation defence be raised before the high court?

Answer: The factual defence that the constable lacked the requisite intent to falsify the register was examined by the trial court and the appellate court, both of which concluded that the evidence showed a deliberate alteration of the entry. The internal procedural rule requiring prior permission from a senior officer was also rejected as it is not a statutory requirement and therefore cannot override the criminal provision. Because these factual matters have already been adjudicated, the constable cannot reopen them through a petition for quashing. The only ground that remains viable is a jurisdictional defence that attacks the very existence of the proceeding – namely, that the prosecution is time barred by the limitation provision. This defence is not a question of intent or factual guilt but a question of whether the law permits the prosecution to continue at all. The high court’s inherent jurisdiction is expressly designed to address such jurisdictional defects, allowing it to dismiss proceedings that are illegal from inception. Raising the limitation defence before the high court is essential because only that forum can interpret the statutory shield for police officers and decide whether the six month period has elapsed. The limitation defence also circumvents the need to relitigate the factual findings, thereby saving judicial resources and protecting the constable’s statutory rights. Consequently, the petition must focus on the legal question of time barred prosecution, and the counsel must demonstrate, with reference to precedent and statutory language, that the limitation provision applies to offences committed under the criminal law when performed in the discharge of duty. This approach aligns with the procedural posture of the case and explains why a factual defence alone is insufficient at this juncture.

Question: What are the possible outcomes of the high court’s exercise of inherent jurisdiction and how will they affect the accused, the prosecution and any subsequent proceedings?

Answer: The high court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction in one of three ways. First, it may find that the limitation provision applies, that the six month period had expired before the FIR was lodged, and that the alleged false entry was made under colour of duty. In that event the court will quash the FIR and dismiss the criminal proceedings, thereby releasing the accused from custody, removing the stigma of conviction and obligating the prosecution to cease all investigative activity. The prosecution would be barred from refiling the case because the limitation defence would have operated as a final bar. Second, the court may determine that the limitation provision does not extend to the offence, perhaps because the act was not performed in the discharge of duty, and consequently refuse to quash the FIR. The case would then proceed to trial on the merits, and the accused would remain under the shadow of the pending prosecution, possibly facing further detention or bail applications. Third, the court may grant a conditional quash, directing the prosecution to file a fresh FIR within a specified period if new evidence emerges, thereby preserving the statutory protection while allowing the state a limited opportunity to pursue the matter. Each outcome has practical implications: a full quash provides immediate relief to the accused and underscores the protective purpose of the limitation provision; a refusal to quash forces the accused to prepare for a new trial and may require the engagement of a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court for bail or revision applications; a conditional quash creates a narrow window for the prosecution to act, prompting the accused to seek further legal advice from lawyers in Chandigarh High Court to monitor compliance. In all scenarios, the high court’s decision will shape the subsequent legal strategy of both parties and clarify the scope of the limitation defence for future cases.

Question: How should the defence evaluate the applicability of the statutory limitation provision to the false‑entry offence and what documentary evidence must be examined before filing a petition for quashing?

Answer: The first step for the defence is to obtain the exact wording of the limitation clause in the police act that purports to shield officers when the alleged act is performed “under colour of duty”. A careful reading will reveal whether the clause uses the term “offence” in a generic sense or limits it to offences arising under the police legislation itself. The defence must then collect all statutory material that defines “under colour of duty”, including any judicial pronouncements that have interpreted the phrase in the context of record‑keeping duties. Parallel to this, the defence should secure the original register entry, the subsequent altered entry, the panchnama, and any internal police manual that mandates prior permission for entries. These documents will help establish the timeline of the alleged alteration and whether the officer acted within the scope of his statutory duty at the time of the change. In addition, the FIR, charge sheet, and the court’s judgment at the appellate level are essential to pinpoint the date of filing of the criminal complaint, which is the critical factor for the six‑month limitation. The defence must also request the service records of the senior officer whose permission was allegedly required, to assess whether the internal rule can be elevated to a statutory requirement. Once the documentary matrix is assembled, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court can draft a petition under the inherent powers of the court, arguing that the limitation provision is both clear and unambiguous, and that the prosecution was instituted after the statutory period elapsed. The petition should cite precedent where the high court has upheld the extension of the limitation to offences under the penal code when performed in the exercise of official authority. By grounding the argument in statutory language, case law, and a precise chronology derived from the seized documents, the defence maximises the chance that the court will deem the proceedings time‑barred and quash them.

Question: What are the risks associated with the accused remaining in custody after the conviction and how can bail or other relief be strategically pursued pending the high court petition?

Answer: The accused faces several practical dangers while in custody, including the possibility of further punitive measures, loss of employment, and the stigma of a criminal record that may affect future promotions within the police service. Moreover, any delay in obtaining relief could extend the period of imprisonment beyond what the conviction itself prescribed, especially if the prosecution seeks to enforce the sentence before the quash petition is heard. To mitigate these risks, the defence should file an application for bail on the ground that the conviction is under appeal and that the high court petition raises a substantial question of law concerning the limitation defence. The bail application must emphasise that the accused is not a flight risk, has ties to the police department, and that the alleged offence, if any, is intrinsically linked to the performance of official duties. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would advise that the bail order should be sought under the provisions that allow release pending the determination of a substantial question of law, and that the court may impose conditions such as surrender of passport and regular reporting to the police station. Simultaneously, the defence can request that the prison authorities preserve the accused’s health and allow access to legal counsel, as any deterioration could be used to argue for immediate relief. If bail is denied, the defence may consider filing a revision petition challenging the legality of continued detention, citing the principle that a person cannot be deprived of liberty while a substantive legal issue remains unresolved. By proactively seeking bail and preserving the accused’s rights during custody, the defence reduces the personal impact of the prosecution and positions the case favourably for a swift high court determination.

Question: In what way does the internal police rule requiring prior permission affect the defence’s argument, and how should lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court assess its statutory weight?

Answer: The internal rule that mandates senior‑officer permission before making a register entry is a procedural guideline issued by the police department, not a legislative enactment. Consequently, its enforceability against a statutory limitation defence is limited. The defence must demonstrate that the rule does not have the force of law and therefore cannot override the clear language of the limitation clause. To do this, lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court should obtain a copy of the rule, examine its origin, and verify whether it has been incorporated into any statutory framework or gazette notification. If the rule is merely an administrative instruction, the defence can argue that non‑compliance does not constitute a criminal act and cannot be used to sustain a conviction. Moreover, the defence should explore case law where courts have held that internal manuals cannot create a criminal liability absent statutory backing. The defence can also raise the point that the prosecution’s reliance on the rule was to explain the alleged omission of permission, but the high court has previously ruled that such procedural lapses are not substantive offences unless expressly criminalised. By establishing that the rule lacks statutory weight, the defence weakens the prosecution’s narrative that the accused acted outside his duty, reinforcing the “under colour of duty” argument that the act was performed within the scope of official responsibilities. This line of reasoning also supports the contention that the limitation provision should apply, as the alleged conduct does not rise to a separate statutory offence beyond the false entry itself. Ultimately, the high court’s assessment of the rule’s legal status will determine whether it can be used to sustain the conviction or whether it must be disregarded in favour of the statutory limitation defence.

Question: How can the defence anticipate and counter the prosecution’s claim that the false entry was not made “under colour of duty” and what evidential strategy should be employed?

Answer: To refute the prosecution’s position, the defence must first establish that the accused was exercising the authority granted to him by law when he recorded the seizure, even if the entry was later altered. This requires a factual matrix showing that the duty to maintain a register of seized narcotics is a statutory obligation of every constable attached to a traffic outpost. The defence should present the relevant police act provisions that impose this duty, as well as any departmental orders that delineate the procedure for recording seizures. Evidence such as the original seizure report, the first register entry made on the day of the stop, and the subsequent altered entry will illustrate that the accused was acting within his official capacity. Witness testimony from senior officers confirming that the accused routinely prepared such entries can further cement the “under colour of duty” narrative. Additionally, the defence can introduce expert testimony on standard police documentation practices to demonstrate that any deviation from the norm still falls within the ambit of official duties. The prosecution may argue that the alteration was a personal act unrelated to official functions; to counter this, the defence should highlight that the alteration was made using the official register, bearing the constable’s signature and seal, thereby invoking the authority of his position. Photographic or forensic analysis of the register pages can also be used to show that the document was not a private note but an official record. By weaving together statutory duty, procedural context, and the physical characteristics of the register, the defence creates a compelling argument that the false entry was indeed made “under colour of duty”. This evidential strategy not only supports the limitation defence but also undermines any claim that the accused acted outside the scope of his official responsibilities.

Question: What procedural steps must be followed to file a petition for quashing under the inherent powers of the high court, and how should the defence structure the relief sought to maximise the chance of success?

Answer: The first procedural requirement is to draft a petition that complies with the high court’s rules of practice, including a concise statement of facts, the specific grounds for relief, and the prayer. The defence should begin by outlining the chronology of the seizure, the register entries, the filing of the FIR, and the date of the charge sheet, thereby establishing that the limitation period had expired. Next, the petition must articulate the legal basis for quashing: the statutory limitation provision, the definition of “under colour of duty”, and the precedent where the high court upheld the extension of the limitation to offences under the penal code. The defence should attach all relevant documents as annexures, such as copies of the register, the FIR, the charge sheet, and any prior judgments. It is advisable to include a verification clause stating that the facts are true to the best of the petitioner’s knowledge. The relief sought should be clearly framed: an order quashing the FIR, directing the prosecution to stand down, and directing the trial court to release the accused from custody if he remains detained. Additionally, the petition may request that the court award costs of the proceedings to the petitioner. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court would recommend that the petition also seek a direction for the investigating agency to preserve all evidence for future reference, thereby preventing any re‑initiation of proceedings on a different basis. Finally, the defence must ensure that the petition is filed within the time limits prescribed for filing a revision or a petition under the inherent powers, and that a copy is served on the prosecution. By meticulously following these procedural steps and presenting a well‑structured prayer, the defence enhances the likelihood that the high court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the time‑barred criminal proceedings.