Can an accused senior technician challenge a preventive detention order and secure interim bail through a habeas corpus petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court?

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Suppose a person who works as a senior technician in a government‑run research laboratory is placed under preventive detention by the central investigating agency on the grounds that the individual may disclose classified information related to a sensitive defence project; the detention is effected under a statutory provision that authorises the agency to hold a person for up to six months without trial when national security is alleged to be at risk. The detained individual files a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, contending that the order of detention is arbitrary, that the procedural safeguards prescribed by the statute have not been complied with, and that the detention is therefore illegal. The petition also seeks interim bail, arguing that the accused is prepared to give a personal bond and that continued custody would cause irreparable personal hardship and hamper the accused’s ability to assist the investigating agency in clearing the allegations.

The investigating agency, acting on behalf of the State, opposes the bail application, asserting that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to grant any form of bail in a proceeding that stems from a preventive‑detention order. It relies on the special policy considerations embedded in the detention provision, claiming that granting bail would defeat the very purpose of the preventive measure, which is to pre‑empt any potential leakage of classified material while the investigation is ongoing. The agency further argues that the only appropriate remedy, if any, is a direct order from the central government to release the detainee, not a judicially‑crafted bail condition.

The core legal problem, therefore, is whether the Punjab and Haryana High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226, possesses the authority to grant interim bail in a habeas‑corpus petition that challenges a preventive‑detention order issued under a national‑security provision. The question hinges on the interpretation of the High Court’s ancillary powers: does the jurisdiction to entertain the principal relief of release automatically include the power to dispense with interim liberty, or does the special nature of the detention statute carve out an exception that bars the court from intervening with bail?

At first glance, the accused could attempt to rely solely on a factual defence, arguing that the investigating agency failed to establish any concrete evidence of a real threat to national security. However, such a defence would have to be raised in the substantive criminal trial that may follow, if the detention is eventually converted into formal charges. While the factual defence is essential for the merits, it does not address the immediate procedural hurdle: the accused is already in custody, and the only avenue to obtain temporary release before the merits are adjudicated is through the writ jurisdiction. Because the detention is preventive and not based on a criminal charge yet, the ordinary criminal‑procedure defence mechanisms—such as filing a bail application under the Code of Criminal Procedure—are unavailable. Consequently, the only viable route to secure interim liberty is to invoke the High Court’s power to grant auxiliary relief in a habeas‑corpus proceeding.

Given that the writ petition is filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the appropriate procedural remedy is to seek an order of interim bail as part of the same habeas‑corpus proceeding. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 is not limited to a binary decision of release or denial; it extends to the issuance of interim orders that preserve the status quo while the substantive question of legality is examined. By framing the bail request as an auxiliary relief, the petitioner aligns the relief sought with the court’s constitutional mandate, thereby avoiding any jurisdictional challenge that the agency might raise. The High Court can, therefore, entertain the bail application, assess whether a prima facie defect exists in the detention order, and, if satisfied, grant a conditional bail that safeguards both the individual’s liberty and the State’s security concerns.

The specific type of proceeding that naturally follows from this analysis is a writ petition for habeas corpus with an ancillary prayer for interim bail. This combined approach enables the petitioner to simultaneously challenge the legality of the detention and request temporary release, ensuring that the court’s decision on the substantive issue does not unduly prejudice the accused’s personal liberty. The petition must articulate the prima facie infirmities in the detention—such as lack of a written satisfaction report, absence of an opportunity to be heard, or failure to specify the exact nature of the alleged threat—while also proposing a bail bond that includes stringent conditions, such as surrender of the passport, regular reporting to the investigating agency, and a prohibition on discussing the classified project.

In practice, a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would draft the petition, meticulously citing the constitutional provision that empowers the High Court to entertain habeas‑corpus applications and the jurisprudence that recognizes the court’s ancillary bail jurisdiction. The counsel would also anticipate the State’s objections by highlighting precedents where the court upheld interim bail despite the preventive‑detention context, emphasizing that the power to grant bail is not a discretionary privilege but a statutory adjunct to the writ jurisdiction. By presenting a balanced argument that respects the State’s security concerns while safeguarding individual liberty, the petition aims to secure a favorable interim order.

Should the High Court grant the interim bail, the accused would be released on the stipulated conditions pending the final determination of the writ petition. If, on the other hand, the court declines to exercise its bail jurisdiction, the accused would remain in custody, and the only remaining recourse would be to appeal the denial through a revision petition before the same High Court or, subsequently, a special leave petition to the Supreme Court. However, the prevailing legal principle—affirmed by multiple judgments—supports the view that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction inherently includes the power to grant auxiliary interim relief, making the bail application a procedurally sound and strategically necessary step.

Thus, the fictional scenario mirrors the essential legal contours of the analysed judgment: a preventive‑detention order, a challenge through a habeas‑corpus petition, a dispute over the High Court’s bail jurisdiction, and the ultimate reliance on the Punjab and Haryana High Court to resolve the matter. By focusing on the procedural remedy of seeking interim bail within the writ petition, the case illustrates why an ordinary factual defence is insufficient at the custodial stage and why the appropriate avenue for relief lies before the High Court, where the constitutional and jurisprudential framework permits the granting of such interim relief.

Question: Does the Punjab and Haryana High Court have the authority to grant interim bail within a habeas‑corpus petition that challenges a preventive‑detention order issued by the central investigating agency on national‑security grounds?

Answer: The factual matrix presents a senior technician of a government research laboratory who has been placed under preventive detention by the central investigating agency, alleging a risk of disclosure of classified defence information. The detainee has filed a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking release from the detention and simultaneously requesting interim bail on personal bond. The legal problem therefore revolves around the scope of the High Court’s jurisdiction: whether the power to entertain the principal relief of release automatically extends to the ancillary power to grant interim bail, even when the detention stems from a special national‑security provision. Jurisprudence consistently holds that once a High Court is vested with jurisdiction to examine the legality of a detention order, it may also dispense with interim liberty to preserve the status quo while the substantive issue is adjudicated. The court’s ancillary powers are not automatically curtailed by the existence of a preventive‑detention statute, unless the statute expressly bars judicial interference, which is not the case here. A lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court would therefore argue that the writ jurisdiction includes the authority to grant bail as an auxiliary relief, provided a prima facie defect in the detention order is demonstrated. Procedurally, the court may entertain the bail application as part of the same writ proceeding, assess the procedural infirmities alleged, and, if satisfied, issue a conditional bail order that balances liberty with security concerns. The practical implication for the accused is that a successful bail application would secure temporary release pending the final determination of the writ, while the State would be required to comply with the court’s conditions, thereby preserving the investigative agency’s ability to continue its inquiry without the detainee’s physical restraint. Conversely, a denial would leave the accused in custody and compel him to pursue appellate remedies, such as a revision before the same High Court or a special leave petition to the Supreme Court, extending the period of deprivation of liberty.

Question: What specific procedural deficiencies in the preventive‑detention order must the petitioner establish to persuade the Punjab and Haryana High Court to grant interim bail?

Answer: The factual backdrop involves an order of preventive detention issued without the procedural safeguards that the enabling statute mandates, such as a written satisfaction report, an opportunity for the detainee to be heard, and a clear articulation of the alleged threat to national security. To obtain interim bail, the petitioner must demonstrate a prima facie breach of these safeguards, showing that the detention order is either arbitrary, lacks requisite documentation, or fails to comply with the statutory requirement of a reasoned satisfaction by the authority. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court would focus on highlighting the absence of a detailed advisory note, the failure to specify the classified material at risk, and the lack of any prior notice or hearing that would allow the detainee to contest the allegations. The legal problem is to establish that these procedural lapses amount to a substantive defect sufficient to justify the exercise of the court’s ancillary bail power. The court, upon reviewing the petition, will scrutinize the detention order for compliance with the statutory framework, assessing whether the investigating agency adhered to the mandated procedure before depriving the individual of liberty. If the court finds that the order was issued on a vague or unsubstantiated basis, it may deem the detention unlawful, thereby justifying the grant of interim bail as a protective measure for the detainee’s rights. The practical implication for the accused is that a successful demonstration of procedural infirmities will likely result in conditional bail, allowing him to assist the investigation while preserving his personal liberty. For the State, such a finding would compel the investigating agency to rectify procedural shortcomings, possibly by issuing a fresh order that complies with statutory safeguards, thereby ensuring that future detentions withstand judicial scrutiny.

Question: What are the procedural avenues available to the accused if the Punjab and Haryana High Court refuses to grant interim bail in the habeas‑corpus petition?

Answer: Should the High Court deny the interim bail application, the accused remains in preventive detention, and the immediate remedy lies in invoking the appellate mechanisms embedded in the constitutional and procedural framework. The first step would be to file a revision petition before the same Punjab and Haryana High Court, challenging the denial on the ground that the court erred in its assessment of the prima facie defects or misapplied its ancillary jurisdiction. If the revision is dismissed, the next recourse is to approach the Supreme Court of India through a special leave petition, contending that the denial infringes upon the fundamental right to liberty and that the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction to grant auxiliary relief. A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court, while not the forum for this case, would be aware that similar procedural routes exist in other jurisdictions, underscoring the uniformity of appellate rights across High Courts. The legal problem thus shifts from the substantive validity of the detention to the procedural correctness of the High Court’s refusal to grant bail. Practically, the accused must continue to be prepared to demonstrate his willingness to comply with stringent bail conditions, such as surrendering his passport and regular reporting, to strengthen any subsequent appeal. The prosecution, on the other hand, would need to justify its stance that bail would defeat the preventive purpose, possibly by presenting fresh material indicating an imminent threat. The procedural consequence of a denial is a prolonged custodial period, which may intensify the urgency for the accused to seek expedited hearing of the revision or special leave petition, thereby ensuring that the deprivation of liberty does not become indefinite without judicial review.

Question: How does the tension between national‑security considerations and the individual’s right to liberty shape the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s discretion in granting interim bail in preventive‑detention cases?

Answer: The factual scenario pits the State’s imperative to safeguard classified defence information against the detainee’s claim of unlawful deprivation of liberty. The legal problem is to balance these competing interests within the constitutional mandate that courts protect fundamental rights while respecting the State’s duty to maintain national security. The Punjab and Haryana High Court, exercising its writ jurisdiction, must assess whether the preventive‑detention order exhibits a prima facie defect that justifies interim bail, without undermining the investigative agency’s ability to prevent a potential leak. Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court would argue that the court’s discretion is not absolute; it must be exercised with a view to preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm to the individual, while imposing conditions that mitigate any risk to security. The court may impose stringent bail conditions—such as a personal bond, surrender of travel documents, periodic reporting, and a prohibition on discussing the classified project—to address the State’s security concerns. This calibrated approach allows the accused to regain temporary liberty, thereby reducing the hardship of prolonged detention, while ensuring that the investigative agency retains effective control over the sensitive information. The practical implication for the accused is that a well‑crafted bail application, emphasizing both the procedural flaws in the detention order and the willingness to adhere to strict conditions, enhances the likelihood of obtaining relief. For the State, the court’s balanced discretion means that it must be prepared to justify any claim that bail would jeopardize national security, possibly by presenting concrete evidence of an imminent threat. Ultimately, the High Court’s decision will reflect a nuanced equilibrium, safeguarding individual liberty without compromising the overarching objective of protecting national security.

Question: Why does the writ of habeas corpus challenging the preventive‑detention order have to be filed in the Punjab and Haryana High Court rather than any other forum, and what procedural advantage does this confer on the accused?

Answer: The factual matrix places the senior technician under a preventive‑detention order issued by a central investigating agency under a national‑security provision. Article 226 of the Constitution empowers every High Court to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights, including habeas corpus, against any unlawful detention. Because the detention was effected within the territorial jurisdiction of Punjab and Haryana, the appropriate High Court is the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which sits in Chandigarh and therefore has territorial competence over the place of detention and the investigating agency’s regional office. This jurisdictional link is essential; a petition filed in a distant High Court would be dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction, forcing the accused to start anew and lose precious time. By filing in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the accused can directly confront the order that holds him, compelling the court to examine whether the statutory safeguards—such as a written satisfaction report and an opportunity to be heard—were complied with. Procedurally, the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is not limited to a binary release or denial; it includes the power to grant auxiliary interim relief, such as bail, while the substantive legality of the detention is examined. This ancillary power is crucial because the accused is already in custody and cannot rely on a conventional bail application under the criminal procedure code, which is unavailable until formal charges are framed. Consequently, the writ route offers the only immediate avenue to secure temporary liberty. Moreover, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has a well‑developed body of case law affirming its authority to entertain bail applications in preventive‑detention writs, providing a predictable legal framework for the petitioner. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court therefore becomes a strategic necessity, as counsel can tailor the petition to the court’s jurisprudence, cite relevant precedents, and structure the auxiliary bail prayer to satisfy the court’s requirement of a prima‑facie defect. This procedural advantage short‑circuits the need for a separate criminal trial to raise factual defences, allowing the accused to focus on the legality of the detention itself and to obtain interim relief that mitigates personal hardship and preserves his ability to cooperate with the investigating agency under strict conditions.

Question: In what way does a factual defence concerning the absence of concrete evidence of a security threat fail to secure the accused’s liberty at the stage of the writ petition, and why must the accused instead rely on procedural infirmities?

Answer: The factual defence the accused wishes to raise—that the investigating agency has not produced any specific classified material or credible threat—belongs to the merits of a substantive criminal proceeding that may arise if the preventive‑detention order is converted into formal charges. At the writ stage, the court’s function is not to adjudicate the truth of the allegations but to examine whether the detention order complies with the procedural safeguards mandated by the preventive‑detention statute and the Constitution. Because the detention is preventive, there is no charge sheet, no trial, and consequently no opportunity to invoke the usual bail provisions under the criminal procedure code. The accused therefore cannot simply argue “I have no evidence against me” to obtain release; the court must first be convinced that the administrative process leading to detention was defective—such as the failure to produce a written satisfaction report, the denial of a hearing, or the omission of a specific description of the alleged threat. These procedural infirmities constitute a prima‑facie ground for the High Court to entertain an auxiliary bail application. If the court finds that the agency complied with all procedural requirements, even a weak factual defence would not suffice to overturn the detention at this stage. Conversely, highlighting procedural lapses directly attacks the legality of the order, which is the core jurisdiction of the writ. This approach also aligns with the jurisprudence that the High Court’s bail power in habeas‑corpus proceedings is triggered by a prima‑facie defect, not by an assessment of the substantive evidence. By focusing on procedural defects, the accused can persuade the court that the detention is ultra vires, thereby justifying interim bail. Practically, this means the accused must retain lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who are adept at drafting precise allegations of procedural non‑compliance, attaching copies of the detention order, and arguing that the agency’s failure to follow statutory mandates renders the detention illegal. Such a strategy maximizes the chance of securing liberty while the substantive factual defence can be preserved for any later criminal trial, if it ever materialises.

Question: How does the possibility of obtaining interim bail as an auxiliary relief within the same habeas‑corpus petition affect the accused’s search for legal representation, specifically the need to approach lawyers in Chandigarh High Court?

Answer: The procedural route that combines the principal relief of release with an auxiliary bail prayer creates a distinct set of advocacy requirements. Because the Punjab and Haryana High Court is seated in Chandigarh, the pool of counsel experienced in handling writ petitions and ancillary bail applications is concentrated among lawyers practising in that High Court. The accused, therefore, naturally seeks lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who possess a nuanced understanding of the court’s procedural rules, its precedent on bail in preventive‑detention writs, and the drafting techniques that satisfy the court’s demand for a prima‑facie defect. These lawyers are familiar with the High Court’s practice directions on filing annexures, the format for interim bail conditions, and the timing of oral arguments, all of which differ from the procedural landscape of a regular criminal trial. Moreover, the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 allows it to issue a stay of the detention order while hearing the bail application, a power that only seasoned counsel can effectively invoke. Engaging a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court ensures that the petition is framed to highlight procedural lapses—such as the absence of a written satisfaction report—and to propose bail conditions that address the State’s security concerns, thereby increasing the likelihood of the court granting interim liberty. The strategic advantage of a local lawyer also lies in their ability to negotiate with the investigating agency’s counsel during the hearing, potentially securing additional safeguards like surrender of the passport or periodic reporting, which the agency may accept as a compromise. Consequently, the procedural necessity of seeking interim bail directly drives the accused to approach lawyers in Chandigarh High Court, as they are the practitioners best equipped to navigate the writ jurisdiction, present the auxiliary bail request, and align the relief sought with the High Court’s established jurisprudence. This targeted search for counsel underscores the practical reality that procedural expertise, rather than merely factual argumentation, is the decisive factor in obtaining temporary release.

Question: If the Punjab and Haryana High Court denies the auxiliary bail application, what are the subsequent procedural steps available to the accused, and how does this influence the decision to file a revision or appeal before the same High Court?

Answer: A denial of interim bail within the writ petition does not terminate the litigation; it merely leaves the accused in custody while the substantive question of the detention’s legality proceeds. The next procedural avenue is to file a revision petition before the same Punjab and Haryana High Court, challenging the bail denial on the ground that the court erred in its assessment of the prima‑facie defect or failed to consider the balance of personal liberty against the State’s security interest. The revision must be grounded in the High Court’s own procedural rules, citing precedents where the court has exercised its inherent power to revisit interlocutory orders that affect liberty. Because the revision is filed in the same forum, the accused can continue to rely on the same counsel—lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court—who is already familiar with the case record and can swiftly raise fresh material, such as newly obtained documents showing the agency’s procedural lapses. If the revision is also dismissed, the accused may then approach the Supreme Court through a special leave petition, arguing that the High Court’s refusal to grant bail violates the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty and that the High Court has misinterpreted its jurisdiction under Article 226. However, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary, and the success of such a petition often hinges on demonstrating that the High Court’s order has a substantial impact on the fundamental right to liberty. Practically, the decision to file a revision rather than an immediate appeal is influenced by the need to preserve the procedural timeline; a revision can be decided relatively quickly, potentially restoring liberty before the Supreme Court’s docket becomes congested. Moreover, the revision route allows the accused to keep the matter within the same judicial ecosystem, where the same judges may be persuaded to reconsider their earlier stance in light of additional arguments or evidence. Engaging lawyers in Chandigarh High Court who are adept at drafting revision petitions and presenting oral arguments before the same bench thus becomes a critical step, ensuring that the procedural safeguards continue to be explored exhaustively before escalating the matter to a higher forum.

Question: How should the accused’s counsel evaluate the procedural compliance of the preventive‑detention order and what documentary gaps can be leveraged to argue for interim bail in the writ petition?

Answer: The first step for a lawyer in Punjab and Haryana High Court is to obtain the original detention order, the satisfaction report signed by the investigating officer, and any advisory notes from the central authority that authorized the six‑month preventive custody. The counsel must scrutinise whether the statutory requirement of a written satisfaction, a specific description of the classified material allegedly at risk, and an opportunity to be heard were fulfilled. In the present facts, the agency’s notice to the accused was terse, lacking a detailed statement of the alleged threat and offering no hearing before the detention took effect. Such omissions constitute a prima facie procedural defect that can be highlighted in the bail prayer. The counsel should also request the production of the internal security assessment that justified the detention; if the agency cannot produce it, the court may infer that the material basis for the order is weak. Additionally, the accused’s service records, clearance certificates, and any prior commendations can be attached to demonstrate that the individual has no motive to betray classified information, thereby strengthening the argument that the detention is arbitrary. The practical implication of exposing these gaps is that the High Court may be persuaded to grant interim bail on the ground that the detention order fails to meet the procedural safeguards mandated by the preventive‑detention statute, while still allowing the State to retain its security concerns through stringent bail conditions. This strategy also prepares the ground for any subsequent revision or appeal, as the identified documentary deficiencies become part of the record for higher judicial scrutiny.

Question: What evidentiary risks does the prosecution face if the investigating agency proceeds to formal charges after the bail is granted, and how can the accused’s team pre‑emptively mitigate those risks?

Answer: Lawyers in Chandigarh High Court must anticipate that the agency’s evidentiary foundation will be examined under the strict standards applicable to national‑security cases, where the burden of proving a real and imminent threat rests heavily on the State. The primary risk for the prosecution is the reliance on classified intelligence that cannot be disclosed in open court, which may lead to the court deeming the evidence inadmissible or insufficient. The defence can mitigate this by filing a pre‑emptive application for a protective order that allows the court to view the classified material in camera, thereby testing its existence and relevance without compromising secrecy. Simultaneously, the accused’s counsel should gather independent expert testimony on the nature of the classified project, demonstrating that the alleged information is either already public or that the accused had no access to the specific details claimed. Collecting communications, emails, and access logs can further show the absence of any opportunity to leak the material. By establishing that the prosecution’s case hinges on undisclosed or speculative intelligence, the defence can argue that proceeding to trial would violate the principles of fair trial and natural justice. The practical implication is that the court may either dismiss the charges for lack of admissible evidence or impose stringent conditions on the prosecution’s evidence‑disclosure, thereby safeguarding the accused’s liberty and limiting the State’s ability to secure a conviction on tenuous grounds.

Question: In what ways can the bail conditions be structured to address the State’s security concerns while ensuring the accused’s personal liberty, and what role does the High Court play in tailoring these conditions?

Answer: A lawyer in Chandigarh High Court can propose a bail framework that balances the investigative agency’s need to prevent disclosure with the accused’s right to liberty. The conditions may include surrender of the passport, mandatory reporting to the designated security officer every fortnight, a prohibition on discussing any aspect of the defence project with any third party, and the execution of a personal bond with a substantial surety. Additionally, the court can order that the accused’s electronic devices be inspected and, if necessary, restricted to prevent inadvertent transmission of classified data. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 empowers it to fashion such interim orders as ancillary relief, ensuring that the bail does not become a loophole for the accused to evade scrutiny. By incorporating a clause that allows the investigating agency to request revocation of bail upon emergence of new material evidence, the court safeguards its own authority to respond dynamically to security developments. The practical implication is that the accused can be released from physical custody, thereby alleviating personal hardship, while the State retains enforceable mechanisms to monitor and control any potential leakage. This tailored approach also demonstrates to the court that the defence respects national‑security imperatives, which can increase the likelihood of the bail being granted despite the preventive‑detention backdrop.

Question: What procedural avenues are available if the High Court denies the interim bail, and how should the accused’s counsel prepare for a swift revision or appeal?

Answer: Should the High Court refuse the bail application, the accused’s team must be ready to file a revision petition under the High Court’s inherent powers, challenging the denial on the ground that the court failed to consider the evident procedural defects in the detention order. The revision must be filed promptly, within the statutory period, and should include a detailed affidavit outlining the specific omissions—such as lack of a hearing, vague threat description, and missing satisfaction report. Lawyers in Punjab and Haryana High Court should also prepare a special leave petition to the Supreme Court, arguing that the denial infringes upon the fundamental right to liberty and that the High Court’s decision conflicts with established jurisprudence on auxiliary bail jurisdiction. In both filings, the counsel must attach all documentary evidence previously gathered, including service records and any communications that demonstrate the accused’s non‑involvement in any security breach. The practical implication of a well‑prepared revision or appeal is that higher judicial scrutiny may compel the court to reconsider its stance, especially if the procedural infirmities are stark. Moreover, the mere filing of a revision can exert pressure on the investigating agency to reassess the necessity of continued detention, potentially leading to a negotiated release or modification of the bail terms.

Question: How can the defence anticipate and counter the State’s argument that only a central government order can release the detainee, and what legal precedents support the High Court’s authority to grant interim bail?

Answer: The defence should marshal jurisprudence where High Courts have affirmed their power to grant auxiliary relief in habeas‑corpus proceedings, even when the underlying detention stems from a special security statute. By citing landmark decisions that held the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 inherently includes the authority to issue interim orders, the counsel can demonstrate that the State’s claim of exclusive central‑government control is not absolute. The argument should emphasize that the High Court’s role is to ensure that any executive action complies with constitutional safeguards, and that refusing to entertain a bail application would effectively render the writ remedy toothless. Additionally, the defence can point out that the preventive‑detention provision itself contains an implicit safeguard against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, which the court must enforce. By highlighting that the State’s reliance on a “policy exception” cannot override the constitutional mandate for judicial review, the counsel can persuade the court that granting bail is a legitimate exercise of its jurisdiction. The practical implication is that, armed with persuasive precedent, the defence can neutralise the State’s procedural objection and secure an interim release, thereby preserving the accused’s liberty while the substantive legality of the detention is examined.