Case Analysis: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shankar and Another

Case Details

Case name: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Shankar and Another
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: J.L. Kapur, K.C. Das Gupta, Raghubar Dayal
Date of decision: 15 February 1962
Citation / citations: 1962 AIR 1154
Case number / petition number: Cr. A. No. 206/1960; Criminal Revision No. 179 of 1959
Neutral citation: 1962 SCR Supl. (3) 213
Proceeding type: Appeal by Special Leave
Source court or forum: Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench)

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

On 28 January 1959 Shankar attempted to force a sexual relationship with Mst. Mithana. When she refused, Shankar cut off her nose. Goberdhan assisted Shankar in the assault and helped conceal the victim after the injury was inflicted. Both accused were charged under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 for voluntarily causing grievous hurt with common intention.

The first‑class magistrate tried the case, found the accused guilty and sentenced each to rigorous imprisonment for eighteen months. The accused appealed to the Sessions Judge of Sitapur. On 12 June 1959 the Sessions Judge set aside the magistrate’s conviction and ordered that the matter be committed to the Court of Session for a fresh trial. Accordingly, on 15 July 1959 the magistrate committed the respondents to the Session Court.

The State of Uttar Pradesh filed a revision before the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench). The High Court held that the offence, although grave, was not exclusively triable by a Session Court and that a Sessions Judge hearing an appeal against conviction could not direct commitment for trial; it set aside the Sessions Judge’s order and directed that the appeal be reheard on its merits.

The State then filed an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, challenging the High Court’s decision. The Supreme Court was called upon to interpret Section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code to determine whether an appellate court could order commitment of an accused to a Court of Session for trial.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

Issue 1: Whether Section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers an appellate court to order that an accused be committed for trial to a Court of Session irrespective of whether the offence is exclusively triable by that Court.

Issue 2: Whether a Sessions Judge, while hearing an appeal against conviction, possessed the authority to direct such commitment for trial under the same provision.

The State contended that the language of Section 423(1)(b) expressly conferred a broad power on an appellate court to order retrial or commitment to a Court of Session and that this power was not limited to offences exclusively triable by a Session Court. It argued that the High Court’s restriction of this power was erroneous and that the order of the Sessions Judge should be restored.

The Allahabad High Court, as the respondent authority, had held that the power to commit an accused for trial was confined to offences that could be tried only by a Court of Session and that a Sessions Judge could not exercise this power, limiting his role to recommending enhancement of sentence.

The respondents, Shankar and Goberdhan, did not appear before the Supreme Court and made no submissions.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

Section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that an appellate court, on an appeal from a conviction, may “order him to be retried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial.” The provision was examined for its plain meaning and legislative intent.

Section 561A of the Criminal Procedure Code, dealing with the procedure for obtaining a certificate under Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution, was mentioned in the proceedings but was not essential to the resolution of the present dispute.

Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, read with Section 34, defined the substantive offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt with common intention.

The Court applied a textual or plain‑meaning rule of statutory construction, interpreting the words “order him to be retried…or committed for trial” without imposing a limitation to offences exclusively triable by a Session Court. Earlier authorities, including Queen Empress v. Abdul Rahiman and Queen Empress v. Maula Baksh, were considered to support a broad commitment power, while the earlier view in Queen Empress v. Sukha was held to have been overruled.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Supreme Court examined the language of Section 423(1)(b) and concluded that the provision unequivocally authorised an appellate court, when hearing an appeal against conviction, to order either acquittal, retrial, or commitment for trial before a court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to the appellate court. The Court held that the words “order him to be retried…or committed for trial” were not qualified by any reference to offences being exclusively triable by a Session Court.

Relying on the plain‑meaning test, the Court rejected the High Court’s restrictive interpretation. It observed that the earlier decision in Queen Empress v. Sukha, which limited the commitment power, had been superseded by later judgments that adopted a broader construction of the analogous provision in the Code of 1882.

Applying this interpretation to the facts, the Court found that the Sessions Judge’s order on 12 June 1959 directing commitment of the respondents to the Court of Session was within the statutory authority conferred by Section 423(1)(b). Consequently, the High Court’s reversal of that order was contrary to law.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal by special leave, set aside the order of the Allahabad High Court, and restored the Sessions Judge’s order directing that the respondents be committed to the Court of Session for trial. The judgment affirmed that Section 423(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers an appellate court to order commitment for trial to a Court of Session irrespective of whether the offence is exclusively triable by that Court, thereby upholding the appellate jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge in this matter.