Case Analysis: Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan and Anr

Case Details

Case name: Mrs. Veeda Menezes vs Yusuf Khan and Anr
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: J.C. Shah, K.N. Wanchoo, S.M. Sikri
Date of decision: 31 March 1966
Citation / citations: 1966 AIR 1773, 1966 SCR 123
Case number / petition number: Appeal No. 209 of 1964; Revision Application No. 913 of 1963
Neutral citation: 1966 SCR 123
Proceeding type: Appeal by special leave (Criminal)
Source court or forum: Bombay High Court

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

Mrs. Veeda Menezes owned a house in Bombay; her husband rented the first floor to Yusuf Khan, the first respondent. On 17 January 1963 the appellant’s servant, Robert, called the respondent’s wife a “thief” and “Halkat.” The following day the respondent slapped Robert’s face. In a heated exchange that ensued, the respondent, feeling annoyed, threw a “file” of papers at the appellant’s husband; the file missed him and struck the appellant’s elbow, leaving a superficial scratch. The appellant lodged a complaint at Bandra police station alleging trespass, assault, and a “bleeding incised wound” on her forearm. The police recorded only a scratch on the appellant’s elbow. Both the appellant and Robert declined examination at a public hospital and were examined by a private practitioner who described a one‑centimetre bleeding incised wound on the appellant’s forearm and a small swelling on Robert.

The matter was tried before the Presidency Magistrate VI, Mazagaon, where a special prosecutor represented the State of Maharashtra. The magistrate convicted the respondent under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, imposing a fine of Rs 10 on each of two counts. The appellant filed Revision Application No. 913 of 1963 before the Bombay High Court. During the revision, the appellant was impleaded as a party because of negotiations for compounding the offence. The High Court held that the appellant had exaggerated her version, that the medical evidence lacked credibility, and that the injuries were trivial; consequently, it set aside the conviction and acquitted the respondent.

The respondent appealed to the Supreme Court of India by special leave (Appeal No. 209 of 1964). The Supreme Court entertained the appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution and considered whether the conviction could be sustained in view of the general exception under Section 95 of the IPC.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was required to determine:

(1) Whether the offence of assault under Section 323 could be exempted by the general exception in Section 95 when the respondent had intentionally caused bodily hurt.

(2) Whether the injury inflicted on the appellant and her servant was so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain, thereby permitting the application of Section 95.

The appellant contended that Section 95 could not be invoked because the act was intentional and that the injuries were more than a mere scratch, constituting a “bleeding incised wound” deserving conviction. The respondent argued that the injuries were trivial, that Section 95 embraced physical injury, and that the harm was so slight as to fall within the exception. The State, although not appearing before the Supreme Court, had originally maintained that the injuries justified conviction and that Section 95 was inapplicable to intentional assaults.

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The Court considered the following provisions of the Indian Penal Code:

Section 323 – voluntarily causing hurt.

Section 95 – a general exception stating that nothing is an offence if the harm caused is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain, irrespective of the offender’s intention or knowledge.

The judgment also referred to Sections 81, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 100, 104, 106, 93, 415, 469 and 499 to illustrate that the term “harm” in the Code is not limited to non‑physical injury and that it includes physical injury. The legal test applied was the “triviality test” of Section 95: the court must assess whether the harm was so slight that a reasonable person would not complain, taking into account the nature of the injury, the relationship of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances.

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court held that Section 95 applied even when the act was performed with intent or knowledge of possible harm, provided the resulting harm was trivial. It rejected the contention that the exception could not be invoked where physical injury was actually inflicted, observing that “harm” in the Code embraces physical injury. The Court examined the factual matrix: the appellant suffered only a skin‑deep scratch on her forearm, and the servant had a slight swelling without bruises. The injuries were described by the private medical practitioner as a one‑centimetre bleeding incised wound and a small swelling, but the High Court had found the medical evidence unreliable. Considering the mutual provocation, the social positions of the parties, and the absence of serious bodily damage, the Court concluded that a person of ordinary sense and temper, placed in the same circumstances, would not have complained. Accordingly, the injury satisfied the “so slight” requirement of Section 95, and the statutory exception barred criminal liability for the alleged assault. The Court therefore affirmed the High Court’s finding that the conviction under Section 323 could not be sustained.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby upholding the Bombay High Court’s order of acquittal of Yusuf Khan. It ordered that Rs 750 be paid to the respondent as part of the costs and that the balance of the previously deposited Rs 1,500 be returned to the appellant. The Court’s decision affirmed that trivial injuries, even if caused intentionally, fall within the ambit of Section 95 and do not attract criminal liability under Section 323.