Case Analysis: Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari vs The District Magistrate, Thana & Others
Case Details
Case name: Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari vs The District Magistrate, Thana & Others
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, B. Jagannadhadas, Syed Jaffer Imam
Date of decision: 08/05/1956
Citation / citations: 1956 AIR 585, 1956 SCR 533
Case number / petition number: Petition No. 439 of 1955, Petition No. 440 of 1955, Petition No. 601 of 1955
Neutral citation: 1956 SCR 533
Proceeding type: Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India
Source court or forum: Supreme Court of India (Original Jurisdiction)
Source Judgment: Read judgment
Factual and Procedural Background
Bhagubhai Dullabhbhai Bhandari, a citizen engaged in a grass‑trading business at Bhilad railway station, was served on 21 January 1955 with a notice issued under section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The notice alleged that he had been involved in the smuggling of foreign liquor, had used criminal intimidation and physical violence against villagers and officials, and possessed unlicensed firearms. He was required to appear before the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 27 January 1955 to explain the allegations. After presenting seven respectable persons as witnesses, the District Magistrate of Thana, on 11 July 1955, issued an externment order directing Bhandari to remove himself from the Thana district for two years and prohibiting his return without written permission.
Kunwar Rameshwar Singh, who described himself as a social worker, received a notice on 2 November 1954 under section 56 read with section 59. The notice alleged that he and associates had extorted money from women engaged in prostitution, shop‑keepers and others in the Kamathipura area of Greater Bombay, using threats of assault. After appearing before the Superintendent of Police and the Commissioner of Police, an externment order dated 4 January 1955 directed Singh to leave Greater Bombay within seven days and to remain outside its limits for two years.
Both petitioners appealed the orders to the Government, which dismissed the appeals in September 1955 (Bhandari) and January 1955 (Singh). They subsequently filed petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court (Petition Nos. 439 and 440 of 1955). The High Courts had dismissed the petitioners’ applications for relief, and the petitioners had been convicted under section 142 of the Act for breaching the externment orders. A special leave petition (No. 601 of 1955) was denied on 21 November 1955, after which the original Article 32 petitions proceeded before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justices Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, B. Jagannadhadas and Syed Jaffer Imam.
Issues, Contentions and Controversy
The Court was required to determine (i) whether sections 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, particularly the power to extern a person on the basis of alleged danger to public safety and the condition that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence, were constitutionally valid; (ii) whether the specific externment orders against the petitioners were ultra vires because the petitioners had not been furnished with the “general nature of the material allegations” as mandated by section 59; (iii) whether the restriction imposed by the orders infringed the fundamental right to move freely under Article 19 and the right to personal liberty under Article 21; and (iv) whether the two‑year period of externment without a statutory requirement for periodic review rendered the provision unreasonable.
The petitioners contended that the statutes infringed Articles 19 and 21, that the requirement of “no witnesses” was not satisfied, that they had been denied a fair opportunity to know the particulars of the allegations, and that the duration of externment was disproportionate. They argued that the externment orders were therefore ultra vires and that the convictions for breach were unsustainable.
The State maintained that the police reports and the petitioners’ own explanations provided reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioners were engaged in offences involving force or violence, that witnesses were genuinely unwilling to appear in public because of safety concerns, and that the procedural safeguards of section 59 had been complied with. The State further argued that the power to extern a person for up to two years was a permissible preventive measure and that the provisions had been upheld in the earlier decision of Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay.
Statutory Framework and Legal Principles
Section 56 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 empowered a Commissioner, District Magistrate or specially‑empowered Sub‑Divisional Magistrate to direct a person to remove himself from the local limits of the jurisdiction when (a) his movements or acts were causing or were calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property, or when there were reasonable grounds to believe that he was engaged or about to engage in an offence involving force or violence, and (b) witnesses were unwilling to give evidence in public because of apprehension for their safety. Section 58 limited the period of externment to a maximum of two years. Section 59 required that the person be given an opportunity to explain the allegations and to be represented by an advocate, and that the “general nature of the material allegations” be communicated in writing. Section 142 created the offence of breaching an externment order.
The Court applied a two‑fold test to assess the validity of an externment order: first, the officer must be satisfied that the person’s conduct posed a threat to public safety or that there were reasonable grounds to believe the person was about to commit a specified offence; second, the officer must be satisfied that witnesses were not willing to give evidence in public. The term “witness” was held to include persons of any description, and the officer’s opinion on unwillingness was deemed sufficient without judicial inquiry into the veracity of that opinion.
In evaluating constitutionality, the Court employed the reasonableness standard under Article 21 and examined whether the restriction on movement was a reasonable limitation on the freedom guaranteed by Article 19. The provision was held to be a valid preventive measure in the interest of public order, provided that the statutory conditions were satisfied.
Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law
The Court interpreted the language of section 56 and rejected the petitioners’ contention that the provision required an absolute refusal of testimony by every possible witness. It held that the statutory requirement was satisfied once the officer formed the opinion that witnesses of any description were unwilling to appear in public. Relying on the precedent set in Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay, the Court affirmed that the power to extern a person was intended for exceptional situations where public safety was threatened and that the provision did not infringe personal liberty in an unreasonable manner.
Applying the two‑fold test to the material before the District Magistrates, the Court found that (i) the magistrates were satisfied that Bhandari’s and Singh’s movements were calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm, and that there were reasonable grounds to believe they were engaged in offences involving force or violence; and (ii) the magistrates recorded that witnesses were unwilling to give evidence because of apprehension for their safety, a circumstance supported by the police reports and affidavits. The Court concluded that the procedural requirement of section 59—providing the “general nature of the material allegations”—had been complied with, as the petitioners had been served with notices and given an opportunity to be heard.
The Court further observed that the power to cancel an externment order at any time rendered the two‑year maximum period constitutionally permissible, despite the absence of a mandatory periodic review. Justice Jagannadhadas, while concurring, expressed that a periodic review might be advisable, but he adhered to the binding precedent and dismissed the petitions.
Final Relief and Conclusion
The petitioners had sought a writ, direction or order prohibiting the enforcement of the externment orders and a declaration that sections 56‑59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court dismissed both petitions, holding that the externment orders were valid and that the statutory provisions did not violate Articles 19 or 21. Consequently, the relief sought to set aside the externment orders and to restrain their enforcement was refused, and the convictions for breaching the orders remained in force.