Case Analysis: Badku Joti Savant vs State of Mysore

Case Details

Case name: Badku Joti Savant vs State of Mysore
Court: Supreme Court of India
Judges: K.N. Wanchoo, P.B. Gajendragadkar, M. Hidayatullah, J.C. Shah, S.M. Sikri
Date of decision: 1966-03-01
Citation / citations: 1966 AIR 1746; 1966 SCR (3) 698
Case number / petition number: Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1964; Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1963
Neutral citation: 1966 SCR 698
Proceeding type: Criminal Appeal
Source court or forum: Supreme Court of India

Source Judgment: Read judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Badku Joti Savant, resided in a village near the Goa frontier while Goa remained Portuguese territory. On 27 November 1960 a Deputy Superintendent of Customs, Goa Frontier Division, Belgaum, received information that contraband goods were stored in the appellant’s house. Acting on that information, he, together with three panchas, raided the house. The appellant was absent; his mother and sister‑in‑law were present. The officers searched the loft of the kitchen, removed a steel trunk, a cane‑box and another steel trunk, and discovered a belt containing four pouches with four gold bars bearing foreign marks and Goa Customs labels, a large sum of money and three small pieces of cut gold. The total weight of the gold bars was recorded as 343 tolas.

On 30 November 1960 the appellant was arrested and interrogated by the same Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise. During the interrogation the appellant gave a written statement, which he signed after it was read to him. In the statement he admitted that the four gold bars had been handed to him on the morning of 27 November 1960 by a person named Vittal Morajkar for delivery to a motor‑stand near Belgaum, and that he had kept the bars in his house.

The appellant was prosecuted under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, read with section 9 of the Land Customs Act, on a complaint filed by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs, Goa Frontier Division, Belgaum. The trial magistrate convicted him, imposed imprisonment, a fine and ordered confiscation of the gold bars.

The appellant appealed to the Sessions Judge, who acquitted him relying on the Calcutta High Court decision in Sitaram Agarwala v. State. The State appealed to the Mysore High Court. The High Court set aside the acquittal, held the appellant liable under section 167(81), considered the confession and other evidence, and restored the conviction and sentence.

The appellant then applied for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court of India. The Mysore High Court granted the certificate on two questions of law of general importance: (1) the correct interpretation of section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act; and (2) whether the appellant’s statement to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise was admissible under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The appeal was listed as Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1964 before the Supreme Court of India, arising from the Mysore High Court judgment dated 20 November 1963.

Issues, Contentions and Controversy

The Court was required to answer two legal questions. The first question concerned the interpretation of section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act and whether a person who was not directly involved in the import of prohibited gold could be held liable under that provision. The second question concerned the admissibility of the appellant’s statement to the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise, specifically whether a Central Excise Officer fell within the meaning of “police officer” under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, thereby rendering the confession inadmissible.

Appellant’s contentions were:

That the statement made on 30 November 1960 was a confession to a police officer and therefore excluded by section 25; he relied on the view that a Central Excise Officer, empowered under section 21(2) of the Central Excise Act, possessed the same powers as an officer‑in‑charge of a police station.

That a broader interpretation of “police officer” should be adopted, citing Nanoo, Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor, and rejecting the narrow view expressed in Radha Kishun Marwari v. King‑Emperor.

That the confession was obtained by threats, invoking section 24 of the Evidence Act.

That the High Court’s reliance on State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram was misplaced and that the later decision in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, which held an excise officer to be a police officer for evidentiary purposes, should control.

That the interpretation of section 167(81) should be narrow, covering only persons directly concerned with the import of prohibited goods.

State’s contentions were:

That the appellant was liable under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, relying on the precedent set in Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal, which allowed the provision to apply to persons not directly involved in the import.

That the Deputy Superintendent of Customs and Excise, as a Central Excise Officer, was not a “police officer” within the meaning of section 25; consequently the confession was admissible.

That the decision in State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram correctly held that a customs officer was not a police officer, and that the case of Raja Ram Jaiswal was distinguishable because the statutory scheme of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act differed from that of the Central Excise and Salt Act.

That although section 21(2) conferred powers similar to those of a police officer for the purpose of an enquiry, it did not make the officer an officer‑in‑charge of a police station, nor did it empower him to file a charge‑sheet under section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

That the confession was not obtained by threats; therefore section 24 of the Evidence Act did not apply.

The controversy therefore centered on the definition of “police officer” for the purposes of section 25 and on the scope of liability under section 167(81).

Statutory Framework and Legal Principles

The Court considered the following statutory provisions:

Sea Customs Act, 1878 – section 167(81), the provision under which the appellant was prosecuted.

Land Customs Act, 1924 – section 9, read with the Sea Customs provision.

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 – section 8(1), which prohibited import of gold without Reserve Bank permission.

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – sections 25 (exclusion of statements made to a police officer) and 24 (exclusion of statements obtained by threat or inducement).

Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 – sections 9, 13, 18, 19 and 21 (the latter conferring investigative powers on Central Excise Officers).

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – sections 173 (preparation of charge‑sheet) and 190 (powers of police officers).

The Court also referred to the following judicial pronouncements:

Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal – interpreting the scope of section 167(81).

State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram – holding that a customs officer was not a police officer for section 25.

Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar – holding that an excise officer under the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act was a police officer for evidentiary purposes.

Nanoo, Sheikh Ahmed v. Emperor and Radha Kishun Marwari v. King‑Emperor – illustrating the narrow and broad approaches to the term “police officer.”

The legal test applied to the definition of “police officer” required an examination of the statutory language of the relevant enactment and the extent of powers conferred on the officer. The Court distinguished between a narrow view (limited to officers properly so‑called) and a broader view (including any officer possessing the powers of a police officer for investigation).

Court’s Reasoning and Application of Law

The Court first addressed the question of liability under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act. It observed that the earlier decision in Sachidananda Banerjee v. Sitaram Agarwal had settled the interpretation of the provision and that the appellant’s conduct – receiving foreign gold bars and concealing them in his house – fell within the class of persons liable under the section. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellant’s guilt on that ground.

Turning to the admissibility of the confession, the Court examined the meaning of “police officer” in section 25. It evaluated the narrow approach, which limited the term to officers formally designated as police, and the broader approach, which could extend the term to officers exercising police‑like powers. The Court analysed the Central Excises and Salt Act, particularly section 21(2), which allowed a Central Excise Officer to exercise powers “similar to those of an officer‑in‑charge of a police station” for the purpose of an enquiry under section 21(1). The Court held that this provision conferred only ancillary investigative powers related to the levy and collection of excise duties and did not elevate the officer to the status of a police officer. The Court further noted that the officer could not file a charge‑sheet under section 173 of the CrPC, a power that is characteristic of a police officer.

Consequently, even under the broader interpretation, the Court concluded that a Central Excise Officer was not a “police officer” within the meaning of section 25. The confession therefore was not excluded by that provision.

The Court then considered section 24 of the Evidence Act. It reviewed the High Court’s finding that the confession had not been obtained by threat or inducement and found no merit in the appellant’s claim of coercion. Accordingly, the Court held that section 24 did not apply.

Applying these conclusions to the facts, the Court affirmed the admissibility of the written statement, held that the conviction under section 167(81) was legally sustainable, and found no error in the lower courts’ findings.

Final Relief and Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the conviction of Badku Joti Savant under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, affirmed the sentence of imprisonment, the fine and the confiscation of the gold bars, and ordered that the appeal be dismissed.